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Radio Spectrum Regulation: The Administrative
Process and the Problems of
Institutional Reform
Glen 0. Robinson*
As the use for radio frequencies expands, criticism of the
present system of allocating this scarce natural resource has
mounted. Professor Robinson reviews the institutions and ad-
ministrative processes of radio frequency allocation and evalu-
ates the case for administrative reform, including the proposals
for adoption of a pricing mechanism. He concludes that this
critical problem will not be resolved by major institutional
change, but only by the improvement of internal administrative
operations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Marie Antoinette's milliner is reported to have observed that
"nothing is new but what has been forgotten." Whether the
comment is accurately attributed I cannot pretend to know, but
it is an enduring thought, and one singularly pertinent to the
subject of this article: the use and regulation of the radio
frequency spectrum. In more than 40 years of radio regulation
there have been countless studies, reports and commentaries on
the problems of radio frequency allocation, use and regulation.
There have been an equal number of recommendations and pro-
posals for changing the regulatory system to create more efficient
and effective spectrum utilization. It is necessary, therefore, to
make more than the usual obeisances to the work of others.
Indeed, for the most part I have not tried to go beyond them, but
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School.
This article is an outgrowth of a study conducted for the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters, and their assistance and coopera-
tion is gratefully acknowledged. The study was, however, an in-
dependent one and neither its conclusions nor those of this article
necessarily represent the views of the NAB or of the broadcasting in-
dustry. Any biases which may appear are those which have been in-
dulgently nurtured by the author alone. I also acknowledge with
thanks the cooperation and assistance of the current Director of the
Office of Telecommunications Management, General James D. O'Con-
nell, as well as that of FCC Chairman Rosel H. Hyde, Commissioner
Kenneth A. Cox and FCC staff members in providing material and in-
formation on the respective functions and responsibilities of the execu-
tive and FCC in regard to radio spectrum regulation. Needless to say
they are not responsible for any errors which may appear or for any
of the opinions given herein.
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have been content with the far more modest aim of reviewing
and appraising what already has been said-and in many cascs
forgotten.
It is a commonplace that the radio frequency spectrum
-the backbone of modern telecommunications-is an extremely
scarce natural resource which is becoming relatively more so as
the types of uses and number of users expand. The variety of
uses of radio spectrum is legion. Though radio and television
broadcasting are most familiar, the frequency spectrum is also
used for military purposes, private and common carrier land
mobile communications, maritime and aviation communications,
long distance radio relay, space communications, radio navi-
gation, and amateur radio.
A general idea of the current magnitude of radio frequency
spectrum use can be acquired from current licensing statistics.
At the close of fiscal year 1967, some 9,811 broadcast stations,
11,545 common carrier stations, and 1,640,371 safety and special
radio services stations-essentially land mobile, aviation, mari-
time, citizens radio and amateur radio-were authorized. This
is apart from federal government stations not licensed by the
FCC, which use over 30 per cent of the spectrum between 30 and
960 mc and over 70 per cent of the spectrum between 960 and
10,000 mc either exclusively or on a shared basis.1
In addition, the number of uses and users continues to expand
at an accelerating rate, particularly in the field of private land
mobile and other safety and special radio services, where the
number of authorized stations increased by more than 100,000
between 1966 and 1967.2 Given the current limitation on the
number of frequencies available, this growing demand for new
and expanded uses of radio frequencies has resulted in mounting
1. For statistics on FCC licensed stations see 33 FCC ANN. REP.
160, 213, 216 (1967); for statistics on Government use see OFFICE OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT, REPORT ON FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT
WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT 10, App. 2 (1966).
See also text accompanying note 97 infra.
"Government," when capitalized, is used throughout to refer to the
federal government. State and local government users, who are li-
censed by the FCC, are referred to as non-Government or private users.
This article adheres to the old style classifications for radio frequen-
cies-kilocycles per second (hereinafter "kc"); megacycles per second
(hereinafter "mc")-in lieu of the now accepted terms "khz" for kilo-
hertz and "mhz" for megahertz. The older terms are still more widely
used and are used by the FCC. The terms are, in any event, inter-
changeable: one megacycle per second equals one megahertz, etc.
2. 33 FCC ANN. REP. 216 (1967).
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concern from both Government and private sectors that the
spectrum may soon be saturated. The result of this "silent
crisis," as one recent report has (somewhat overdramatically)
described it,3 has been to bring renewed attention to a problem
which has been studied and restudied since radio regulation was
inaugurated over 40 years ago: how to allocate the spectrum to
achieve optimum use of and social benefit from radio. More
specifically, how can the conflicting interests and competing de-
mands for the spectrum-both Governmental and private-be
reconciled? What priorities must be established among com-
peting uses? What institutional organization and adminis-
trative processes are required to deal adequately with the prob-
lem?4
I. HISTORICAL PREFACE
The history of radio spectrum management has been exten-
sively explored by others. However, a brief outline of the his-
tory of the present regulatory institutions and a review of the
3. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS SCIENCE PANEL,
ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM UTILIZATION-THE SILENT CRISIS (1966).
4. In August, 1967, the President appointed a Task Force to make
a comprehensive study of telecommunications policy, including the allo-
cation and use of the spectrum. The Task Force reported its findings in
December, 1968. BROADCASTING MAGAZINE, Dec. 16, 1968, at 30. As this
goes to print, the official report of the Task Force to the President has
not been made public. There are, however, a number of summaries of its
findings and proposals purportedly based on final drafts shown to the
news media. See, e.g., INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS, Dec. 13, 1968, at
3-9; id., at 30-38; N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1968, at 41. Although these con-
tain only a bare outline of a 450 page report, it is believed that the
basic conclusions and proposals of the Task Force are accurately re-
ported. Some of these basic conclusions, as reported, will be discussed
in this article.
As will be made apparent below, the Task Force is not breaking
new ground. Studies have been conducted repeatedly under either ex-
ecutive or congressional auspices since at least 1944. The present study
is, however, the most ambitious since 1951, when a similar investi-
gation was made by a presidential "Communications Policy Board."
5. A valuable resume of important events up to 1959 by the
former Office of Civil Defense Mobilization, on which the following
discussion relies for many events not elsewhere chronicled, is contained
in Hearings on Spectrum Allocation Before the Sub-Comm. on Com-
munications and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 130-44 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959
Hearings on Spectrum Allocation]. A recent study of radio spectrum
allocations also contains a chronicle of events to the present time.
See Metzger & Burrus, Radio Frequency Allocation in the Public Inter-
est: Federal Government and Civilian Use, 4 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1-47(1965) [hereinafter cited as Metzger & Burrus].
19691 1181
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
major past studies and proposals for institutional reform is a
necessary preface to an analysis of the current administrative
processes of radio spectrum allocation and management.
A. CREATION OF THE REGULATORY FRAmEWORK
Although the history of radio communications regulation
dates back at least to 1912, when the first federal law regulating
radio communication was enacted,6 the first attempt at compre-
hensive regulation was the Radio Act of 1927.7 This was pri-
marily an attempt to solve the interference crisis which had re-
sulted from the failure of prior efforts at regulation.8 The Act
established the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) with compre-
hensive regulatory powers, including the power to classify radio
stations, to assign frequencies to various classes of and individual
stations, and to determine hours of operation, power, and geo-
graphical service areas. However, the 1927 Act was concerned
only with allocation and use of frequencies by non-Government
users. Radio stations "belonging to and operated by the United
States" were exempted from regulation.9 These were to operate
on frequencies assigned pursuant to presidential authority, ac-
tual assignments being made by coordination of user agencies
through the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC),
a group comprised of the various federal government users.10
In 1928 the FRC was granted membership on IRAC.'1 But
as a mere member of IRAC, the FRC could exercise no more con-
trol over Government frequency use than IRAC or the President
6. 37 Stat. 302 (1912). The Act of 1912 had been preceded by
the Wireless Ship Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 629 (1910), but the 1910 Act did
not regulate radio communications; it only required ocean vessels to be
equipped with radio.
7. 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
8. For a discussion of the events leading up to the 1927 Act, see
J. HEmMG & G. GRoss, TELErommUcArIONS 242-45 (1936).
9. 44 Stat. 1162, 1165 (1927).
10. IRAC was formed in 1922 with the primary purpose of advis-
ing the Secretary of Commerce on various radio matters of common in-
terest to users. However, it soon became involved in the assignment of
frequencies to Government stations which were also exempt under the
Act of 1912, this becoming its primary function. This role was formal-
ized shortly after the 1927 Act when the President advised the Secretary
of Commerce that he wished to have all radio frequency applications
from Government agencies submitted to IRAC. 1959 Hearings on
Spectrum Allocation at 130. For a history of IRAC, see id. at 106-08;
Coase, The Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee, 5 J. LAw &
EcoN. 17-20 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Coase].
11. 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 106.
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could exercise over private allocations and use.12  And, since
the Act drew no distinctions between Government and non-Gov-
ernment use, the dual jurisdiction created an obvious potential
conflict between the FRC and IRAC over Government and non-
Government allocations-a conflict for which no means of reso-
lution other than compromise had been provided. This potential
conflict now seems so evident that it might be wondered why
so little attention was given to creation of a unified authority.
However, the War and Navy Departments were particularly ap-
prehensive about giving control to an independent outside agency
such as the FRC, which might not adequately consider military
needs. 13 Also, at this time the supply of frequencies was con-
sidered sufficient to accommodate all users-Government and
non-Government-so that the occasion for serious conflict be-
tween the FRC and IRAC presumably was not foreseen.
In January, 1934, the Interdepartmental Committee on Com-
munications recommended to the Senate Commerce Committee
that a single agency be formed to regulate all radio communi-
cations.14 In June, 1934, the Communications Act of 1934 was
enacted. 15 The substance of the Radio Act of 1927 was retained
with relatively little change since the primary purpose of the
new Act was not to modify the structure of radio regulation but
to create a single permanent, independent agency to regulate all
forms of electrical communication whether by telephone, tele-
graph, cable or radio. Thus, the Federal Communication Com-
mission was created to take over the functions previously exer-
cised by the FRC and the Interstate Commerce Commission,'0
which then had jurisdiction over telephone and telegraph.
12. Id. at 136.
13. See 67 CoNG. REc. 12497, 12631 (1926); Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
92-93 (1926).
14. Message by Franklin D. Roosevelt, in STuny or Co1\umMCA-
TioNS, S. Doc. No. 144, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1934).
15. 48 Stat. 1064 passim (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 1 passim
(1964). For a history of the various bills leading to the Act of 1934, see
H. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW 783-88 (1948).
16. The FCC was also given certain rate regulation authority over
telegraph companies previously exercised by the Postmaster General.
S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
It is apparent that a major motive for the consolidation of func-
tions, particularly in the Senate, was not unification for its own sake so
much as it was a concern that telephone and telegraph regulation under
the jurisdiction of the ICC was not adequate. See id. at 2. Indeed, the
Senate bill called for organization of the FCC into two divisions, one
for telephone and telegraph and one for radio (principally broadcasting),
the effect of which would have been similar to creation of two separate
19691 1183
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The provisions of the Radio Act exempting federal govern-
ment stations from FRC regulation-and authorizing the Presi-
dent to take over radio communications facilities in time of na-
tional emergency-were carried over into sections 305(a) and
606 (a), (c), (d) of the 1934 Act respectively. 7 Even at this
early date there was dissatisfaction with the failure to coordinate
the needs of Government and private stations, and there existed
the feeling on the part of some that there had been excessive de-
mands on behalf of some Govermnent departments.' 8 Despite
all this, it does not appear that any extended consideration was
given to a possible alteration of the administrative structure for
frequency allocation or bestowing authority over both Govern-
ment and non-Government users on a single administrative
body.19
B. THE EMERGING PROBLEM
Through the 1930's, dual jurisdiction over the radio spectrum
seems not to have created serious impediments to effective man-
agement. If there was conflict between the demands of the
private and Government sectors, it appears to have been more a
theoretical than an actual problem. The FCC succeeded to the
FRC's membership on IRAC and the coordination between the
two bodies appears to have been adequate at this time. In part,
the successful coordination in the early management of the spec-
agencies. This was rejected by the House, which merely permitted such
a division by the Commission if it deemed it appropriate. See H.R.
REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934). The House version was
enacted. See notes 219-20 infra, and accompanying text for further
discussion.
17. To those radio facilities which the President was authorized
to take over were added wire facilities. 48 Stat. 1064, 1083, 1104
(1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 305(a), 606(a), (c) & (d) (1964).
18. Hearings on S. 6 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Com-
merce, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1929) (testimony of Louis Caldwell,
former General Counsel to the Radio Commission).
19. In the Senate hearings on one of the principal forerunners of
the 1934 Act, Louis Caldwell made the rather vague suggestion that
"Government departments ... handle Government stations, and the
Federal Radio Commission will handle private stations with a common
authority to which their conflicting demands may be submitted, say, to
the President." Id. at 53. This was not pursued by Caldwell or the
Senate Committee. A few other scattered references to the question of
allocations and allocations authority appear in the hearings on the earlier
bill, but there is no significant discussion of the problem. Id. at 204-05,
254, 1067. No references were found in the hearings on the House Ray-
burn bill which subsequently became the Act of 1934. See Hearings on
H.R. 8301 Before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm.,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)
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trum can be attributed to the fact that radio communications
was still in its infancy and frequency demands for new and ex-
panded radio uses had not yet begun to press against the supply
which a maturing technology was able to make available. How-
ever, this favorable balance of supply and demand was to change
with the great expansion of private and Government radio uses
during the 1940's.
Given the increased demand for frequencies, particularly by
the military during World War II, the problem of effective man-
agement and coordination between the FCC and IRAC became a
matter for concern. In 1943 Congress appointed a select commit-
tee to investigate the FCC.20 Although it was not primarily
concerned with spectrum allocation, the committee did inquire
into the problem. Because of the growing competition between
Government and non-Government use, the committee sought to
discover whether the FCC and IRAC:
worked together satisfactorily as two agencies with comple-
menting jurisdiction in the matter of making assignments and
whether or not they were making wise and equitable divisions
of the limited available radio spectrum among the services un-
der their respective jurisdictions.21
It is apparent, however, that the committee was less concerned
with whether the system was producing equitable allocations
than with whether the federal government users, particu-
larly the military, were getting what they wanted-an en-
tirely natural concern given the paramount concern for meeting
wartime needs. During the committee hearings it was proposed
that IRAC be made an "independent agency," though the pro-
posal was evidently premised not on the belief that IRAC should
be free of the executive, but that since the Chairman of the FCC
was also serving as the Chairman of IRAC, it was necessary that
the Commission be prevented from "dominating" IRAC.22 How-
ever, efforts to bring about a reorganization of IRAC by execu-
tive order were tabled and not revived.23
The fear of possible "dominance" by the FCC-a curious
contrast to later complaints that the FCC is too subservient to
20. See H.R. REP. No. 2095, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1945).
21. Id. at 13.
22. Id. at 14. The term "independent" was not defined, but it ap-
pears that what was intended was an agency with some formal status




MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1179
the demands of federal government users24---was clearly ground-
less, as the select committee's report indicates. The committee
concluded that the system "seems to have functioned with rea-
sonable satisfaction" and that the broad division of jurisdiction
between the FCC and IRAC "seems to be a logical one.' '2r
There continued to be dissatisfaction with the system, however,
particularly with what was regarded as a failure to establish
broad policy objectives of telecommunications. To assist in the
formulation of policies and the development of plans for the
most effective use of wire and radio, the Telecommunications
Coordinating Committee (TCC) was established under the spon-
sorship of the State Department in 1946. The Committee was
comprised of the FCC, the Departments of State, Treasury, War,
Navy, Commerce, and later the Air Force.2 Although the TCC
still exists, it has not developed into the high level policy plan-
ning organization that was anticipated. It has become in fact
little more than an advisor to the State Department.27
24. See, e.g., Coase at 29; 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation
at 87-88.
25. H.R. REP. No. 2095, supra note 20, at 13-14.
26. 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 132.
27. Id. See also the analysis of -the failure of the TCC by the
President's Communications Policy Board which affords an insight
not only into the problems of the TCC but the entire problem of joint
planning and coordination:
At the outset it was thought this committee [the TCC] could
formulate policies and develop plans and programs which would
promote the most effective use of wire and radio facilities. The
FCC, however, pointed to its statutory responsibility for policy
formulation and advice to Congress on such matters, and stated
that its participation in any group such as TCC could not re-
lieve it of these obligations or bind it in any way. The State
Department reiterated its initial view that the TCC could work
only by unanimity, and that there must be no intrusion on the
statutory or other authorized responsibilities of any of the com-
ponent agencies .... TCC is weighted with representatives of
military interests and functions, who besides are chiefs of the
communications services of the three departments-that is, us-
ers and operators of specialized services rather than officials
charged with agency-wide responsibilities .... The diffi-
culty here arose from the fact that much of telecommunications
policy formation has to do with dividing scarce resources among
military claimants, other Federal Government claimants, and
non-Government claimants. Officials heading extensive serv-
ice agencies, with larger potential demands on their services
than they can expect to meet, can hardly be expected to take
an impartial view of such questions as the national require-
ment for a share of the world's frequencies, or division of the
national share among all claimants.
PRESIENT'S COiUNICATIONS POLICY BOARD, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A
PROGRAM FOR PRoGarss 201-03 (1951) [hereinafter cited as TELECOMmU-
NicATIoNs: A PROGRAM FOR PROGRESS].
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In the same year in which the TCC was created the Bureau
of the Budget released the report of a study on allocation of
radio frequencies to Government agencies.28  The study rejected
the possibility of vesting the authority to assign radio frequencies
to Government users in the FCC or in any single executive de-
partment. It concluded: (1) If the FCC was charged with
making all frequency assignments, it would be subject to much
greater political pressure and to accusations of bias from both
sides. As a result, its regulation of private radio would be made
more difficult. (2) Creation of a Department of Communications
was not feasible: "the regulation of one department by another
generally has been quite unsuccessful" since executive agencies
will not permit a co-equal agency to control their internal oper-
ations. 20 In lieu of these alternatives the study recommended
executive establishment of an office of Coordinator of Govern-
ment Radio to advise the President in telecommunications mat-
ters and to coordinate Government allocations.
Despite the Budget Bureau study's rejection of major institu-
tional change, dissatisfaction with the handling of Government
allocations and the belief that federal users were getting more
than their fair and necessary share of frequencies continued.
This led to a 1950 legislative proposal for fundamental reorgan-
ization of allocations authority, introduced by Representative
Sadowski, Chairman of the Radio Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.30 In addition
to proposing certain changes in FCC broadcasting regulation,3 1
the Sadowski bill proposed to deal with the problem of allocations
by creating a five man independent executive agency known as
the "Frequency Control Board." The Board would have had au-
thority to: (1) allocate, cancel, and modify frequencies; (2) assign,
cancel and modify federal government station frequencies; and (3)
prescribe regulations to govern FCC assignment of frequencies to
non-Government stations. The Board would have been directed to
28. SE mAN & MOORE, ALLOCATION OF RADIO FREQUENCIES TO GOVERN-
MENT AGENCIES, BUREAU OF BUDGE= PROJECT 46-40, cited in 1959 Hearings
on Spectrum Allocation at 132.
29. Id.
30. H.R. 6949, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); see 96 CONG. REc. 838-40
(1950).
31. The Sadowski bill would have (1) given the FCC additional
administrative sanctions with respect to radio station licensees and per-
mittees, (2) rendered licensees immune from criminal or civil actions as
a result of statements made in the course of political broadcasts and
(3) broadened section 315 to include not only political candidates them-
selves but their designated spokesmen.
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disapprove proposed FCC assignment of any frequency to non-
Government stations, if such assignment would (a) cause harmful
interference with any federal government use of radio, or (b)
violate any regulation of the Board with respect to assignments by
the FCC. Finally, the bill would have authorized a "Military
Liaison Committee" to advise the Board. On any matter involv-
ing national defense, this Committee would be authorized to re-
fer the question to the Secretary of Defense, who in turn could
appeal to the President, who would then make the final decision.
That the provisions of the bill would have given control over
all allocations to the executive-principally to the military 32 -
seems somewhat incongruous in view of Sadowski's evident con-
cern that the federal government was getting more than its
share of allocations due to the inadequacy of the existing struc-
ture to control Government demands.8 3 The ostensible reason
for not vesting this allocation authority in the FCC, a logical
alternative given the concern over federal-user dominance, was
that the Commission was already overburdened and that the
proposal to create a separate agency would hopefully "so lighten
the workload of the Commission that the .. .backlog can be
eliminated and that the Commission can become current in its
work."34 Given the attacks on the Commission at that time for
its backlog of work,35 this explanation may offer a plausible
reason for not giving the FCC complete allocation authority, but
32. The OCDM later commented on this proposal that:
By virtue of right of appeal to the President through the Sec-
retary of Defense, the [Military Liaison] Committee, in matters
of national defense, would have a virtual veto power over the
Board.
1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 133.
33. Introducing his bill in the House, Sadowski stated:
[T]he charge has been made that, as a result of the inade-
quacy of this machinery, private applicants for space in the
spectrum have come out second best. It has been contended
that the Federal Communications Commission has been given,
to distribute among private applicants, that portion of the spec-
trum that has been left over after the Federal Government
agencies took the space that they desired. . . . [I]t is poor bus-
iness to leave the apportionment of an important natural re-
source like the radio spectrum ... to a planless system of
compromises between two public bodies, each sovereign in its
own field, neither of which is responsible to the people for the
apportionment that results from their respective actions.
96 CONG. REc. 839 (1950).
34. Id.
35. The McFarland Bill, S. 1973, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), pro-
posing a number of basic reorganizations in the FCC, its staff and its
procedure, was motivated in part by the delays and backlog of work.
See Hearings on S. 1973 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. passim (1949).
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it does not explain why the authority should be given to the
federal executive if the concern was with inadequate controls on
federal use of frequencies. It is more probable that this was the
only way the proposal to create a single authority could be made
palatable to the military establishment and executive.
Sadowski's proposal failed for a number of reasons. First,
there was general industry opposition to the bill.3 6 Second, the
bill's nonallocation features overlapped and competed for atten-
tion with the McFarland reorganization bill which had already
passed the Senate. 37 Third, the subsequent establishment of the
President's Communications Policy Board pre-empted the allo-
cation proposals.38
C. THE PRESIDENT'S CO1IavAMiCATIONS POLICY BoARD
The President's Policy Board, headed by a former FCC Com-
missioner, Dr. Irvin Stewart, was created in 1950 for the broad
purpose of studying the present and potential use of radio and
wire communications by Government and non-Government users
and to make policy and implementation recommendations.39
Among the central issues with which the study dealt was that of
formulating policies and/or changing or strengthening existing
organizations to deal with the "conflicting interests and needs of
Government and private users of the spectrum space."
40
In 1951 the Policy Board released its report.41 Regarding
the current organizational structures for dealing with the prob-
lem of spectrum allocation and management, the Board con-
cluded that the "whole Government telecommunications struc-
ture is an uncoordinated one" and that "there is need for a better
determination of the division in the national interest of fre-
quency space between Government and non-Government
users."
42
See also COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SPECIAL
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., REGULA-
TION OF BROADCASTING 116-21 (Subcomm. Print 1958).
36. Industry opposition was aimed at both the Frequency Con-
trol Board proposal and the bill's non-allocation features. COMMITTEE
ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, supra note 35, at 126.
37. See id. at 122, 126-38. The McFarland bill with some modifi-
cations was enacted into law as the Communications Act Amendments
of 1952, 66 Stat. 711.
38. See 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 133.
39. TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A PROGRAM FOR PROGRESS at 2-3.
40. Id. at 8-9.
41. The report is often referred to as the "Stewart Report," and
that title is sometimes used in this article.
42. TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A PROGRAM FOR PROGRESS at 18.
11891969]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The Policy Board's dissatisfaction with the present adminis-
trative structure was directed principally at the inadequacies
of IRAC and the lack of effective control over federal govern-
ment and private use.43 However, the Board rejected sweeping
institutional change. Believing that the problems of spectrum
management could be solved within the framework of the exist-
ing dual allocations authority,44 it rejected as unwise the unifi-
cation of allocations control by vesting full authority in either
the FCC or an executive agency.45 The Board concluded that a
simpler and better solution-at least one which should be at-
tempted before more drastic reorganization was undertaken-was
for the federal government to "bring its house in order and then
try to match its needs with those of the Federal Communications
Commission."46
To accomplish these goals, the Stewart Report recommended
the creation, by executive order, of a three-man "Telecommuni-
cations Advisory Board" whose primary responsibility would be
to carry out the planning and executive functions of the Presi-
dent with respect to assignment of frequencies, to advise the
President of Telecommunications policy, and particularly to:
establish and monitor a system of adequate initial justification
and periodic rejustification and reassignment of frequencies
assigned to Federal Government users, and, in cooperation with
the Federal Communications Commission, supervise the division
43. Id. at 183-206.
44. 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 78 (testimony of Dr.
Stewart).
45. TELECOMMuN=cAnoNs: A PROGRAM FOR PROGREss at 216. Else-
where in its report the Board further elaborated on its objections to
vesting of authority in the FCC:
The two most important considerations against placing new
functions in [the] FCC, and in our opinion the conclusive ones,
are these: First, the FCC in its capacity as representative of the
interest of non-Federal communications agencies, is in effect a
user. As such, it would never be accepted as an impartial ar-
biter by other Federal users. Second, it would be unwise and
improper to give to the FCC the power to make decisions which
affect the administration of executive agencies, or which relate
closely both to foreign relations and to national defense.
Id. at 197. Also mentioned was the FCC's existing workload and its
hesitancy about acquiring this additional responsibility. Id. at 196.
The Board's report does not elaborate on its objections to vesting allo-
cations authority in an executive agency under the control of the
President, but implicit is the same reasoning as that which underlies its
rejection of FCC control: it would involve a serious conflict of interest.
An independent "super board" was rejected for reasons similar to the
rejection of FCC control: it would interfere with executive preroga-
tive. Id. at 208.




of frequency spectrum space betveen Government and non-
Government users. 47
IRAC would continue as "a specialized agency to perform the
detailed work of assigning frequencies to federal government
users but under [the policies and supervision of the Telecom-
munications Advisory Board]."'s
In April, 1951, shortly after the release of the Stewart Re-
port, Senator Johnson introduced a bill which would have given
the FCC authority to assign frequencies to federal government
users in accordance with regulations approved by the President.49
Coming on the heels of the Board's study which not only had
recommended a different solution but had strongly rejected the
idea of giving the FCC such allocations authority, it is not sur-
prising that the Johnson proposal enjoyed no success. The FCC
was not eager to take on this responsibility and pointed to the
contrary recommendations of the Stewart Report, stating that
it would be preferable to wait until its recommendations could
be implemented. 0
D. ATTEMPTS AT REFOR1V AFTER THE STEwART REPORT
1. The Telecommunications Advisor
At least partially to implement the Stewart Report's recom-
mendations, President Truman established the position of Tele-
communications Advisor in October of 1951. The Advisor was to
"assist and advise" the President in "coordinating the develop-
ment of telecommunications policies and standards applying to
the executive branch of the Government" with respect to the
assignment of radio frequencies to Government users; in "es-
tablishing policies and procedures governing such assignments
and their continued use;" and finally in "developing U.S. Gov-
ernment frequency requirements."51 He was directed to "per-
form his functions with the aid, or through the facilities, or ap-
propriate departments and agencies of the Government," IRAC
being specifically directed to report to and assist the advisor.52
The Telecommunications Advisor effected a number of re-
organizational changes in IRAC. Among the most important
was the establishment in 1952 of a Frequency Assignment Sub-
47. TELEco1mUNIcATIoNs: A PROGRAM FOR PROGRESS at 18-19.
48. Id. at 207.
49. S. 1378, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1951).
50. 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 135.




committee (FAS) comprised of representatives of IRAC mem-
bers and the FCC to handle all routine frequency assignments to
federal users.53 The purpose was to free IRAC itself for higher
level policy planning. Although it was reported that the new
Telecommunications Advisor was making "real progress" towards
improving federal frequency allocations and overall policy plan-
ning, the position was abolished by President Eisenhower only
two years after its creation. In June, 1953, the functions and
responsibilities of the former advisor were transferred to the Di-
rector of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), and in
turn subdelegated to an ODM Assistant Director for Telecom-
munications. 54 Although the responsibilities were unchanged,
the position and authority were downgraded. A further down-
grading of the position and functions of the Telecommunications
Advisor came with the 1958 merger of ODM and the Federal Civil
Defense Agency into the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
(OCDM). The telecommunications functions were assigned to
the Director of the OCDM but delegated to an Assistant Director
for Resources and Production and further delegated to a Deputy
Assistant Director for Telecommunications.5 5
2. The Potter and Bowles Recommendations
The failure to establish effective control over spectrum use
by federal agencies as had been urged by the Stewart Report
resulted in other proposals for reform. 6 In 1957 Senator Potter
introduced a resolution in the Senate proposing to establish a
special commission to investigate federal government use of the
spectrum. 7 The resolution was approved by the Senate. How-
53. 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 109.
54. Exec. Order No. 10460, 3 C.F.R. § 947 (1953). See also 1959
Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 134, 136. The responsibilities of
the ODM were expanded in 1957 by delegating to it full presidential
authority under sections 305 (a) and 606(a), (c) & (d) of the Communica-
tions Act. However, this delegated authority was to be exercised only
in time of war. See Exec. Order No. 10705, 3 C.F.R. § 363 (1957).
55. 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 105, 134, 142.
56. One proposal in 1953 warrants passing mention. In August,
1953, Representative Wolverton introduced a bill in the House proposing
to establish a Telecommunications Policy Committee consisting of rep-
resentatives of the FCC and the Departments of State, Defense and
Commerce. The purpose of the proposed Committee was to coordinate
the development of telecommunications policy and formulate plans
with respect to the best utilization of the spectrum. Not surprisingly,
nothing came of the proposal which, as later described by the OCDM,
would have done no more than "to establish a high level IRAC." 1959
Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 136.
57. Id. at 139.
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ever, acting on the suggestion of the ODM, the House reported
out the resolution with an amendment calling for an investi-
gation of the use of the spectrum by federal and nonfederal
users alike. The amended resolution, although concurred in by
the FCC, was opposed by the broadcast industry as well as
Senator Potter himself and subsequently failed.58
In 1955 the Senate Commerce Committee, motivated princi-
pally by the UHF/VHF television difficulties, 9 convened an ad
hoc Advisory Committee headed by Edward Bowles to make a
survey and reappraisal of television allocations. For the most
part the Bowles study is only tangentially relevant to the gen-
eral allocations problem. Its principal concern was with the
specific regulatory policies of the FCC, ranging from deinter-
mixture of UHF and VHF channels problems to the problems of
color television, educational television, and the exercise of licen-
sing power by the Commission. The Committee's report also gives
a lengthy and detailed analysis of the multiple functions, prob-
lems and failure of the FCC.60
Pertinent to the allocations problem, however, was a recom-
mendation to establish a communications authority as part of
the executive structure.6 1 The proposal was intended to rein-
state the recommendations of the President's Policy Board in
1951. As the Bowles committee concluded:
The Stewart report was an enlightening contribution by com-
petent authorities. If one is to judge from the results, the re-
port was irresponsibly handled at the Executive level and
ignored at the Congressional level. The record shows there is a
legislative job yet to be done.62
3. Cooley Committee Study
In November, 1958, the Director of OCDM appointed a Spe-
58. 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 140. An editorial in
BROADCASTING MAGAZINE, Aug. 18, 1958, at 34, explained the reason for
the broadcasters' opposition:
The ... bill was killed because broadcasters felt, in their
battle for self preservation, that they had no alternative....
More had to be known about the reason for shift in emphasis
from military to broadcast use of the spectrum.
59. The story of these difficulties is now well known. For a his-
tory of the problem prior to 1962, see Note, The Darkened Channels:
UHF Television and the FCC, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1578 (1962). See also
Hearings on Television Allocations Before the Senate Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4585-4601 (1960).
60. AD Hoc ADVISORY COMmITTEE ON ALLOCATIONS TO THE SENATE
COMNITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
ALLOCATION OF TV CHANNELs (Comm. Print 1958).




cial Advisory Committee on Telecommunications, chaired by Vic-
tor E. Cooley, a past Deputy Director of OCDM. The Committee
was to review the current administrative organization and pro-
cedures for dealing with day-to-day matters relating to tele-
communications management within the executive branch, ana-
lyze the growing demands for frequency assignments by both
Government and non-Government users, and make recommenda-
tions for change. On December 29, 1958, the Cooley Committee
submitted its report to the Director of OCDM.
63
The central problem discovered by the Committee was vir-
tually the same as that identified by the President's Communi-
cations Policy Board in 1951: inadequate control of federal gov-
ernment use of the spectrum.4 The Committee concluded that
an extensive study of the current uses of the spectrum-par-
ticularly Government uses-was necessary before consideration
of any sweeping change in the regulation and control of telecom-
munications by the Government. In advance of such a study,
however, it recommended congressional creation of a three-man
National Telecommunications Board within the Executive Office
of the President, having direct access to the President and the
heads of Government agencies using telecommunications. The
Board's function would have been to formulate telecommuni-
cation policies and standards designed to assure efficient tele-
communication management, including formulation of criteria,
engineering standards, and procedures for allocation of frequen-
cies to various Government agencies. As part of its "special
duties" the Board was also to (1) review the national table of
frequency allocations employed by Government and non-Govern-
ment users, and (2) study the role of the FCC and the executive
agencies in telecommunications management. The Board was to
63. The report is printed in 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation
at 40-49.
64. In reviewing the structure as it has evolved, the Committee
was continuously struck by the absence of adequate provision
for high-level consideration on the Government side of a variety
of matters of vital national importance in the area of tele-
communications. The Federal Communications Commission
provides a vehicle for adequate consideration in the non-Gov-
ernment area. In sharp contrast, as indicated earlier, decisions
in the area of Government use or of conflict between Govern-
ment and non-Government use, are often made by compromises
at the operational level by staff members, who though compe-
tent in their fields, do not necessarily have the total picture of
national interest. There is also an unfortunate absence at
present of anyone in the executive branch with adequate





report its findings and recommendations, including any recom-
mendations for changes in existing administrative organization. 5
The proposed Board would not have had authority over non-
Government allocations; the jurisdiction and functions of the
FCC was to be unaffected. Although the whole question of the
dual, FCC-executive control of allocations was to be studied by
the Board, the Cooley Committee was not primarily occupied
with that problem. The primary concern of the proposed Board
was to put the executive's house in order.60 The purpose was
thus to substitute a framework in which two agencies, the FCC
and the Board, could effectively work together, in lieu of the FCC
and a host of "independent" executive agency-users who could
not.0 7
It is evident that the Board would not have had final author-
ity over those Government allocation matters which would have
continued to lie with the President.68 While the question
whether there should be an "overriding board" to rule on all
Government allocations was one of the questions to be studied
by the Board, 9 the Committee evidently felt that even without
formal, overriding authority the Board would be able to control
Government allocations and consolidate Government needs. 70
The Cooley Committee's approach of attempting to consoli-
date Government allocations into one executive body acting un-
der the President, while leaving intact the dual FCC-executive
jurisdiction over the spectrum generally, was thus virtually the
same approach taken by the President's Policy Board in its 1951
report. The only notable difference, as explained by the head
of the 1951 Board-who was also a member of the Cooley com-
mittee-was that the Policy Board would have left the creation of
the executive board to the President rather than Congress. 7 '
In May, 1959, Oren Harris, Chairman of the House Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee, introduced a bill7 2 recom-
mended by the Cooley Committee to implement its proposals.
Though hearings were held on the bill and on the problem of allo-
65. Id. at 43-44.
66. See id. at 50.
67. See id. at 54-55.
68. Id. at 54.
69. Id. at 44, 53.
70. Id. at 50, 55, 78.
71. Id. at 78.
72. H.R. 7057, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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cations generally,73 the only result was the introduction of an-
other bill by Harris in July. 4
Harris' second bill would have created a so-called "Govern-
ment Frequency Administrator" with authority similar to that of
the so-called "National Telecommunications Board" proposed
earlier. However, the second Harris bill went beyond the earlier
bill and the Cooley Committee's recommendations. In addition
to creating the Government Frequency Administrator it would
have created a three man "Frequency Allocation Board" in the
executive branch to: (1) conduct continuing investigation of, and
develop long-range plans for, the utilization of the spectrum; (2)
allocate, modify or cancel on its own initiative-or on application
by the FCC or the Frequency Administrator-radio frequencies
for federal and non-federal government use "as the Board deems
appropriate;" and (3) advise the President on foreign relations
matters concerning use and division of the spectrum. Finally,
in cases involving "questions of national security or foreign re-
lations" the President would have express power of review, in-
cluding the power to modify or completely override an order of
the Board.
In its essential terms, the second Harris bill was little more
than a revival of the Sadowski bill of 1950. Both bills would
have unified final allocations authority in a so-called "independ-
ent" agency in the executive branch, something of a contra-
diction in terms. Harris' proposed creation of a Government Fre-
quency Administrator to handle directly the allocations among
Government users-evidently replacing IRAC- is a refinement
of the earlier Sadowski bill, but apart from this the thrust of the
proposals seems pretty much the same. Like the Sadowski bill,
the Harris bill was never reported out of committee.
4. 1960 and After: The Continued Pursuit of Reform
In 1960, prompted by the continuing concern over the grow-
ing need for more effective radio frequency control, the Senate
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences issued a staff
report on "Policy Planning for Space Telecommunications."7 5
Although primarily concerned with problems of space communi-
cations, the report's conclusions and recommendations were
73. 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation.
74. H.R. 8426, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
75. POLICY PLANNING FOR SPACE TELECOmmuNICATIONS, REPORT TO
THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print Dec., 1960).
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broader. It concluded that there was no effective coordination
of spectrum management nor any developed policy regarding
spectrum use. It recommended a comprehensive study of tele-
communications policy, including a study of the mechanisms of
policy formulation and coordination between the Departments
of State and Defense, NASA, the FCC, the OCDM (OEP) and
the Bureau of the Budget.78
These conclusions were reinforced by those of James Landis
in his report on regulatory agencies to the President-elect in
December, 1960, which concluded that there was an urgent need
for greater coordination among the various agencies concerned
with radio frequency allocation and management.7 7 Although
Landis' evaluation suggested rather pervasive weaknesses
throughout the system, his proposal for institutional reform was
a relatively modest and simple one. Landis proposed the creation
of an Office for the Coordination and Development of Communi-
cations Policy within the Executive Office of the President, and
the transfer to this office of all of the powers vested in the
OCDM.78
Acting partially on these recommendations, President Ken-
nedy in 1962 established the Office of Telecommunications Man-
agement (OTM) within the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP).
The OTM was responsible for coordinating the telecommunica-
tions activities of the executive branch, promoting uniform pol-
icies and standards, developing data with regard to frequency
requirements, encouraging research and development activities,
and contracting for studies and reports related to these responsi-
bilities. The President's authority under section 305 (a) of the
Communications Act to assign, amend, modify or revoke fre-
quencies was delegated to the Director of the OEP with specific
authority to redelegate to the OTM.79 The Director of the OEP
did redelegate this authority to the OTM to be exercised with
the assistance of IRAC.80 The responsibilities and functioning
of the OTM and the extent to which this reorganization has
altered frequency allocation and management in the federal sec-
76. Id. at 76.
77. J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-
ELECT, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-28 (1960) (printed for the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee).
78. Id. at 86.
79. Exec. Order No. 10995, 3 C.F.R. § 535, 47 U.S.C. § 305 (1962).
80. MILITARY OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., SATELLITE COMMUNI-
CATIONS 80 (Comm. Print 1964).
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tor will be discussed in greater detail below. Of course, the
authority of the FCC over allocations to nonfederal users and
the absence of any control over the division of the spectrum be-
tween federal and nonfederal users were unchanged by the Pres-
idential reorganization of 1962.
Notwithstanding the persistence of criticism, and a growing
number of private studies urging institutional reform,81 the basic
regulatory structure and administrative processes of spectrum
allocation have not changed since 1962. A closer look at this
structure and process of regulation is now necessary.
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES OF
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
At the outset brief mention should be made of the basic
international framework within which both federal government
and nonfederal government allocations are made. The current
framework is that established in Geneva by the 1959 International
Telecommunication Convention8 2 and supplemental regula-
regulations,8 3 as modified in 1963.84 The radio spectrum is allo-
cated on a world-wide basis85 among broad service classes such
as "broadcasting," "land mobile" and "radionavigation." Al-
though some service allocations are exclusive, many frequency
bands are allocated for shared use by several services. For non-
exclusive allocations, three priorities are established: "primary,"
"permitted" and "secondary." The first two have equal status
except that in the preparation of frequency plans the "pri-
mary" service has priority. Stations of "secondary" service are
required to protect "primary" or "permitted" stations against
harmful interference. In addition, the Convention establishes
certain minimum technical standards and provides methods for
eliminating or minimizing interference and for registration of fre-
81. E.g., Coase; Metzger & Burrus; Rosenblum, Low Visibility
Decision Making by Administrative Agencies: The Problem of Radio
Spectrum Allocation, 18 Ai). L. REv. 19 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Rosenblum].
82. Radio Regulations, Dec. 21, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 1761, T.I.A.S. No.
4892.
83. Radio Regulations, Dec. 21, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 2377, T.I.A.S. No.
4893.
84. Partial Revision of Radio Regulations, Geneva 1959, and Addi-
tional Protocol, Nov. 8, 1963, 15 U.S.T. 887, T.I.A.S. No. 5603.
85. For purposes of allocation the world is divided into three re-
gions which very roughly are: region 1-Europe and Africa; region 2-




quencies with the International Frequency Registration Board,
an organ of the International Telecommunications Union, which
in turn is an organ of the United Nations.
The Geneva Convention makes provision for regional and
bilateral agreements among members so long as such agreements
are consistent with the Convention. The United States is a party
to many such agreements, 6 some of the more noteworthy being
the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement between
the United States, Canada, Cuba, Dominican Republic and the
United Kingdom on behalf of Jamaica and the Bahama Islands;8 7
the United States-Mexico Agreement on Radio Broadcasting;88
the Canadian-United States Television Allocations Agreement;8 9
and the United States-Mexico UHF and VHF television allo-
cations agreements.9 0
Within this international framework, domestic frequency al-
locations and management are subject to the dual authority of the
FCC and the OTM. The discussion which follows describes brief-
ly the basic allocations process with respect to the private sec-
tor and the federal sector, as well as the coordination between
the two. No attempt will be made to go into extensive detail
with respect to the particular procedures and operational policies
relevant to the allocations process. Even to list all of the per-
tinent regulations, manuals, and policy directives would be an
exhaustive task-and largely a fruitless one from the standpoint
of examining the basic institutional structure and processes.
A. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Three very broad classifications of services have been es-
tablished for purposes of allocating frequencies among nonfed-
eral users as well as for regulating and licensing: (1) Common
Carrier, (2) Safety and Special Services and (3) Broadcast. Each
of these broad classifications is in turn broken down into more
specific categories of services. For example, the Safety and
Special Radio Services includes: (1) Industrial Radio Services,
(2) Public Safety Radio Services, (3) Land Transportation Radio
86. For a current list see 47 C.F.R. § 2.603 (1968).
87. Nov. 15, 1950, 11 U.S.T. 413, T.I.A.S. No. 4460.
88. Jan. 29, 1957, 12 U.S.T. 734, T.I.A.S. No. 4777.
89. June 23, 1952, 3 U.S.T. 4443, T.I.A.S. No. 2594.
90. Ultra High Frequency Channel Allocation Agreement with
Mexico, July 16, 1958, 9 U.S.T. 1091, T.I.A.S. No. 4089; Border Televi-




Services, (4) Marine Radio Services, (5) Aviation Radio Services,
(6) Citizens Radio Services, and (7) Amateur Radio and Disaster
Communications Service.9 1 Finally, each of the Safety and Spe-
cial Services is further subdivided. For example, the Industrial
Radio Service includes some 10 services: (1) Petroleum Radio
Service, (2) Forest Products Radio Service, (3) Special Industrial
Radio Service, (4) Manufacturing Radio Service, (5) Power Radio
Service, (6) Business Radio Service, (7) Motion Picture Radio
Service, (8) Relay Press Radio Service, (9) Industrial Relocation
Service, and (10) Telephone Maintenance Radio Service.92
1. Service Allocations
Allocations planning, development of technical allocation
standards, consideration of international treaty matters, and co-
ordination with the executive are all a part of the initial respon-
sibility of the Frequency Allocation and Treaty Division of the
Office of the Chief Engineer. Allocations among the various
services and among classes of users within each service are hand-
led through administrative rule-making proceedings. The rule-
making procedures, conducted in conformance with section 4 of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 93 characteristically entail
widespread participation by members of the industry with some
limited participation by members of the public. Although par-
ticipation is in many cases confined to submission of written com-
ments, oral argument is frequently permitted in major proceed-
ings. Also, since rule-making proceedings are not generally "re-
stricted" proceedings within the meaning of the Commission's ex
parte communications rules,94 direct, off-the-record contact with
the Commission by interested persons may be permissible. How-
ever, rule-making proceedings may be subject to the prohibition
against ex parte contracts where (1) the proceeding involves a
particular contest of issues among parties or between interested
parties and the Commission, or (2) the Commission in its notice
of rule-making has expressly restricted the proceeding, requiring
all communications to be made on the record.95
91. See 33 FCC ANN. REP. 88-105 (1967).
92. 47 C.F.R. §§ 91.251-.755 (1968).
93. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1964).
94. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1201-.1251 (1968). See generally Ex Parte
Presentations, 1 F.C.C. 2d 49, 5 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1681 (1965).
95. Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d
221 (D.C. Cir. 1959). The Commission has not promulgated rules ap-
plicable to rule-making proceedings generally, but has indicated its
intention to specify on an ad hoc basis those rule-making proceedings
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The basic structure of allocations and the division of the
spectrum among the different services in the private sector has
been largely fixed since 1949. 90 Very broadly, the spectrum, from
.01 to 90,000 mc, is divided as follows: 97
Percentage
of total




Land Mobile 42.7 0.1
Others (miscellaneous; e.g.,
aeronautical, maritime, amateur,




The controversy with respect to private user allocation-
principally that of accommodating the growth of the land mobile
users-has focused primarily on the portion of the spectrum be-
tween 30 and 960 inc,98 particularly on the 470-890 mc band which
is currently allocated exclusively to UHF television. The non-
broadcast users-chiefly land mobile-have fought vigorously for
reallocation of a major segment of this band to nonbroadcast use.
to which ex parte prohibitions will be applied. Rule Making Pro-
cedures, 30 Fed. Reg. 9277, 5 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1701 (1965). Some
rule-making proceedings such as those establishing rates are required
by statute to be decided on the record after notice and hearing. These
are, of course, subject to the ex parte rules. 47 C.F.R. § 1.1207 (1968).
96. 32 FCC ANN. REP. 48-49 (1966); General Mobile Radio Serv-
ice, 13 F.C.C. 1190 (1949).
97. Derived from 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (1968). Frequencies are given
to the nearest tenth of a megacycle and percentages to the nearest tenth
percentile.
All frequencies below 25 mc are included within the "shared" cate-
gory. Most of these are shared by Government and non-Government
users, although this is not specifically indicated in the rules. It should
be noted that although these figures include all frequencies up to 90,000
mc, all frequencies above 40,000 mc, except for a two mc band assigned
for radio astronomy, are used only for amateur or experimental pur-
poses. The 50,000 mc above 40,000 are included in the "shared" category.
98. Broadcasting and Government users have 55.3 per cent and
25.8 per cent of this portion of the spectrum respectively. Some 8.2 per
cent is shared use; 4.4 per cent is allocated to land mobile; 3.5 per cent
to "other" (mostly aeronautical and maritime) and 2.8 per cent is not
allocated. See OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1WANAGEMENT, REPORT ON
FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE ExEcUTIVE BRANCH OF THE Gov-
ERNMENT 10, App. 2 (1966) (The OTM figures have been adjusted to
reflect the recent transfer of 26 mc from Government to private use).
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In its 25 to 890 mc proceeding in 196419 the Commission de-
clined to do so but proposed instead to meet the immediate
needs of land mobile users by "channel splitting" in one impor-
tant band of frequencies already allocated, a measure recently
put into effect,'00 and to continue to study other possible meas-
ures including shared use of some television channels. However,
more recently the Commission has instituted rule-making pro-
ceedings to investigate possible reallocation of the upper UHF TV
band to land mobile use in part as a consequence of the Govern-
ment's relinquishing some 26 mc above 890 mc from Govern-
ment allocated frequencies to private use.1' 1 It has instituted
similar proceedings to investigate the possibility of land mobile
sharing of certain lower UHF frequencies as a "short term"
measure102
99. Report and Order, Allocation of Frequencies Between 25 and
890 mc, 29 Fed. Reg. 4820, 2 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1513 (1964). This
proceeding was instituted in 1957 to review existing allocations policies
and to examine all allocations made in this band. The Commission
found that the land mobile services were not only making full utilization
of their frequencies for a variety of important uses, but that they were
looking forward to continuation and expansion of such uses. But the
problem of finding spectrum space was not as easily resolved as that
of identifying the need for it. There was only one existing source of
additional usable but unused space-those frequencies between 470 and
890 mc allocated to UHF television. However, the Commission in 1964
concluded that, while reallocation of UHF television channels was "wor-
thy of consideration" in 1957, since there was (a) uncertainty as to the
viability of UHF television and (b) some possibility of expansion of the
number of VHF channels available, subsequent developments were
considered to have changed both of these circumstances. The OCDM
had closed the door to any possibility of obtaining additional VHF chan-
nels, and the passage of the all-channel receiver law in 1962, 47 U.S.C.
§ 330 (1964), had made possible a viable VHF-UHF television system.
These considerations, coupled with increased need for additional televi-
sion services---commercial and educational-led the Commission to con-
clude that the 82-channel television system should be retained "as
against usage of this frequency space for the other various purposes
considered in this proceeding." 28 Fed. Reg. 4830, 2 P & F RADIO REa.
2d at 1541.
100. Report and Order, Frequencies in 450-470 mc Band, 13 F.C.C.
2d 866, 12 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1556 (1968).
101. Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 33
Fed. Reg. 10807 (1968). The proposal, if adopted, would result in the
reallocation of 40 mc for private land mobile use and 75 mc for common
carrier use in the 806-960 mc band (some 26 mc remains allocated to
the Government and the remainder of the frequencies now allocated
to private use would not be modified). This would involve reallocation
of UHF TV channels 70-83 to land mobile uses to be shared with tele-
vision translators.
102. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Dkt. No. 18261, F.C.C. 68-743(July 17, 1968). The Commission's proposal is to study the possibility
of shared use of certain of the lowest seven UHF frequencies in the
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Once allocations are made among the various services, assign-
ment of frequencies to individual users is made through licens-
ing.103 The processing of licenses is initially the responsibility of
three service bureaus. Though detailed analysis of the licensing
processes for the various services is beyond the scope of this
article, a brief survey of broadcast and private land mobile serv-
ices licensing may be helpful.
(a) Assignment to Broadcast Users
Licenses in the broadcast services are issued for a three year
term, but are renewable, and generally renewed, over an indefi-
nite number of terms. Applicants must satisfy a variety of
nontechnical qualifications regarding citizenship, character (ab-
sence of some past misconduct such as violation of antitrust
laws), financial matters (ability to construct and operate station),
legality of operation (conformance with multiple ownership
rules) and program proposals. If these qualifications are satis-
fied and the license application meets all technical specifications
a license is normally issued unless the application is protested or
a competing, mutually exclusive application is filed. In that
case an adjudicative hearing may be required. 0 4
Broadcast licenses confer exclusive use of the assigned fre-
quencies within a specified area with the corresponding protec-
tion against co-channel and adjacent channel stations. Technical
standards for frequency assignment and use vary greatly among
the three broadcast services. The AM radio band-535-1605 kc-
largest 25 urbanized areas where demands upon the spectrum are great-
est. The Commission regards this proposal as a short term approach on
the assumption that there is an immediate need for spectrum space for
land mobile use and that the equipment changes by land mobile users
to use these frequencies could be made easily.
103. An excellent general summary of the structure of broadcast
licensing is set forth in W. JoNEs, CASES ON REGULATED INDUSTRIEs 1050-76(1967). A more detailed outline of the technical aspects of licensing on
which the following discussion draws substantially is FCC OFFC OF
THE CHIEF ENGINEER, REPORT No. F-6601, TECHNIcAL AsPEcTs OF CoN-
SIDERATIONS OF FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS 9-20 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
FCC REP. No. F-6601]. The licensing standards, procedures and re-
quirements for the Broadcast Service are set forth in 47 C.F.R. pt. 73
(1968).
104. On the requirement of hearing, see, e.g., Ashbacker Radio Corp.
v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945) (mutually exclusive applications); FCC v.
NBC (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943) (hearing on protest of electrical inter-
ference); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (hearing on public protest to program prac-
tices); Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(hearing on protest of economic injury).
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is divided into 107 channels with 10 kc separation between assign-
able frequencies. 10 5 The channels are divided into three general
classes: (a) clear channels for high-powered stations (Classes
I & II) intended to provide primary (groundwave) and secondary
(nighttime, skywave) service over an extended area; (b) regional
channels for medium-powered stations (Class III) intended to
provide primary service to larger cities and contiguous rural
areas; and (c) local channels for low-powered stations (Class IV)
intended to provide primary service only to a city or town and
contiguous area. Each class of stations has well defined protected
contours within which its signal is intended to be free of "ob-
jectionable interference"-as defined by the Commission's rules
-from co-channel and adjacent channel stations. The degree of
protection also varies depending on the class of station.
The FM band-88-108 mc-is divided into 100 assignable
channels, each 200 kc in width. The first 20 channels are re-
served for use by noncommercial, educational stations, the re-
maining 80 for regular commercial use. Somewhat analogous to
the AM structure, commercial FM channels are divided into three
classes, A, B, and C. Class A channels are designed for low-
power stations intended to serve relatively small communities
and surrounding area. Class B channels are designed for me-
dium-power stations intended to serve a sizeable city or town or
the principal city of an urbanized area. Class C channels are for
high-power stations intended to serve a community or city and
large surrounding areas. Noncommercial, educational FM sta-
tions operate with very low power on a fourth class of channel,
Class D. Unlike the AM allocation scheme, however, commercial
FM channels are assigned through rule-making proceedings to
105. The Commission has recently implemented a "freeze" on the
filings of further applications for AM stations pending a study to deter-
mine whether:
(i) a significant national need for new AM stations or major
changes in existing stations which would not serve underserved
areas still exists; (ii) presently available frequency space should
be conserved for future use in developing areas and to eradicate
what "white" area remains; (iii) any future allocation system
should view AM and FM as a single aural service; and (iv) fur-
ther AM assignments on a demand basis constitute unwise use
of valuable spectrum space.
Report and Order, Freeze on AM Applications, 13 F.C.C. 2d 866, 867-68,
13 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1667, 1669 (1968). The freeze is the second in re-
cent years to be put on AM applications. The earlier freeze resulted in a
tightening of technical and service needs criteria for AM licensing,
see Report and Order, AM Assignment Standards, 2 Fed. Reg. 9492, 2
P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1658 (1964), but the number of AM stations has
continued to expand greatly without, however, meeting the needs of
populations in unserved ("white") or underserved ("grey") areas.
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specific communities and can only be used in that community or
within a 25 mile radius. The table of assignments is based on a
system of minimum mileage separations between co-channel and
adjacent channel stations. Protection against interference de-
rives solely from these minimum mileage separations and from
the specification of maximum power and antenna height for sta-
tions of the various classes. For assignment purposes the county
is divided into three zones, I, I-A and II. Class A low-power
stations operate solely on Class A channels in all three zones.
Class B medium-power stations may operate on either Class B
or Class C channels, but only in Zones I (roughly the northeast
quarter of the country) and I-A (most of California). Class C
stations may use either B or C channels, but only in Zone II,
which is that portion of the country not in the other two zones.
The mileage separation varies depending on the class of stations
involved so that, for example, the co-channel separation between
two A stations is 65 miles, and between a Class A and Class B it is
150 miles.
In television, there are 82 channels of 6 mc each. Channels
two to four occupy 54-72 mc; channels five and six, 76-88 mc;
channels seven to 13, 174-216 mc. The 70 UHF channels occupy a
single band, 470-890 mc. As in the case of FM, television chan-
nels are assigned by rule-making to specific communities. The
system of assignments is based on a plan of minimum mileage
separation requirements similar to that for FM, but there is
only a single class of service. As in the case of FM, television
licensees are protected from interference solely by means of the
minimum mileage separation requirements' 0 6 and the specifica-
tion of maximum powers and antenna heights. These three
specifications-mileage separation, power, antenna height-vary
depending on the channel involved and on the zone of the coun-
try. For television the country is divided into three zones,
analogous to but not entirely identical with those for FM.
(b) Assignment to Private Land Mobile Users' 0 7
The licensing of private land mobile users varies consider-
106. In some exceptional cases the mileage separation requirements
have been waived and "equivalent protection" provided by means of
directionalization. See generally Interim Policy on VHF TV Channel
Assignments, 29 Fed. Reg. 9942, 21 P & F RADio REG. 1695 (1961).
107. On the technical standards and requirements for private land
mobile licensing see FCC REP. NO. F-6601; 47 C.F.R. pts. 89 (public
safety), 91 (industrial radio), and 93 (land transportation). No attempt
has been made to describe the licensing of common carrier services, the
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ably from the licensing of broadcasters. Licenses are generally
issued for five year terms, but are renewable an indefinite
number of times. Nontechnical qualifications, apart from that of
citizenship, are virtually nonexistent and technical requirements
are generally not exacting. If minimal technical requirements
are met, a license is generally issued as a matter of course.
The principal bands allocated to non-Government land mo-
bile use are 30-50 mc (alternate one megacycle segments are as-
signed to Government and non-Government respectively), 150.8-
162 and 450-470 mc. As technology has progressed, the separation
between channels has been reduced. The spacing varies, some
services in the 150.8 mc band using frequencies separated by 15
kc, others by 30 kc. In the 30-50 mc band, 20 kc is the standard
separation while in the 450-470 kc band, separation has now been
cut to 25 kc.
Unlike broadcast and common carrier licensees, private land
mobile frequencies are licensed on a nonprotected, nonexclusive
basis. Thus individual users within a particular service and in a
particular area share the frequencies on a "party line" basis.
Also, some frequencies are assigned to two or more different
services where the services tend to operate in different geo-
graphical locations.
Although individual users are not protected against inter-
ference, some measures are taken to minimize it. License ap-
plicants seeking assignment of a frequency must file a state-
ment that existing licensees operating on the same or adjacent
channels within a specified area have been notified of the appli-
cation. Additionally, the applicant must submit a report based
on a field study of the same area indicating the probability of
interference to existing users. As an alternative, however, an
applicant may submit a statement from a frequency advisory
committee comprised of other users in the same service area
which contains the opinion of the committee as to the most
desirable assignment. Because of the expense of notification and
engineering studies, the latter alternative is the prevailing
method of frequency coordination. Although neither the appli-
cant nor the Commission is bound by the recommendations of
the coordinating committee, in practice the recommendations are
accepted.
standards for which are more akin to those for broadcast stations than
private land mobile stations. See generally FCC REP. No. F-6601; 47
C.F.R. pt. 21 (1968).
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In addition to user coordination, the Commission in some
instances makes service assignments on a geographical basis. For
example, the 30-50 mc band provides longer range communi-
cation for a given combination of power and antenna height than
do higher bands. Accordingly, it is highly suitable to services
requiring coverage over larger areas, such as police, highway
maintenance or forestry-conservation. However, the band is
also subject to long distance interference during periods of high
solar activity. To prevent this effect, the Commission assigns
one of these frequencies to a limited number of adjoining states
and does not assign it again except to another group of states
approximately 2,500 miles away.
2. Supervision of Use
Supervision of use and compliance with Commission regu-
lations, licensing standards and policies are the initial responsi-
bility of three major bureaus-the Broadcast Bureau, the Safety
and Special Services Bureau and the Common Carrier Bureau-
correspoinding to the three major services. In the Broadcast
Service probably the most important method of supervision is
the process of renewal by which the licensee has at least the
burden of demonstrating compliance with regulations and regu-
latory policy. L0 8 However, renewal of individual licenses is the
norm from which there are infrequent deviations.
License renewal is not the only means of ensuring compli-
ance and, outside the Broadcast Service, is probably not even
the most important means. The Commission's Field Engineering
Bureau maintains a system of monitoring, inspecting and inves-
tigation of both broadcast and nonbroadcast stations, principally
to detect unlicensed stations and to ensure compliance with non-
interference and other technical regulations. 10 9 Where enforce-
ment action may be warranted, the information gathered by the
monitoring or inspection is forwarded to the bureau having pri-
mary responsibility for the service. 110 Violations are punish-
able by a variety of formal sanctions, including cease and desist
orders for nonlicensed stations, license revocation, forfeiture,
and even criminal penalties."' The FCC's monitoring capa-
108. E.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
109. See 33 FCC ANN. REP. 106-16 (1967).
110. Id. at 110.
111. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1964) (revocation); 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(b) &
(c) (1964) (cease and desist order); 47 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502 (1964) (crim-
inal penalties); 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1964) (forfeiture).
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bility, however, is far from complete, particularly in the Safety
and Special Services area where the number of users is vast
and the nature of the use varied. Thus the Commission does not
now have adequate information on frequency loads and utiliza-
tion in the land mobilization services, although it has contracted
for a partial study of the problem by the Stanford Research
Institute." 2 It is understood, however, that this study is limited
to quantitative loading and does not entail investigation into
the manner in which frequencies are being used.
B. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR
From 1922 to 1951, the President's powers over allocation
and use of frequencies by the federal government under section
3051 3 were implemented solely through IRAC, a committee
comprised of the principal Govermnent users, which assigned
frequencies chiefly through coordination, negotiation and com-
promise among the users themselves. In 1951 IRAC was nomi-
nally placed under the direction of the Telecommunications Ad-
visor, subsequently coming within the authority of the ODM,
and still later the OCDM. Essentially, however, the process of
allocation remained unchanged through these various reorgani-
zations.1 4 As earlier noted, in 1962 the President's authority
under section 305 was delegated to the Director of the Office of
Emergency Planning (now the Office of Emergency Prepared-
ness). Also delegated to the Director were the telecommuni-
cations functions and responsibilities previously vested in the
OCDM, including those contingent on a declaration of emergency
by the President."1 5 At the same time the position of Director
112. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Dkt. No. 18261, FCC 68-
743 (1968). The Commission has undertaken some special monitoring
studies of utilization. E.g., FCC OFFicE OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER, RE-
PORT No. F-6701, REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF NEW YoRK CITY MONITORING
SURVEY OF 150.8-162.0 MEGACYCLE LAND MOBILE BAND (1967). Also some
private studies have been made of frequency usage in certain cities
and areas.
113. 47 U.S.C. § 305(a) (1964). Under § 305(d), the President also
has authority to authorize use of low power radio by foreign govern-
ments at their embassy or legation in Washington, D.C. In addition,
he has emergency powers to control all communications in the event of
war or national emergency under § 606. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 606(a), (c),
(d) (1964).
114. For a description of IRAC and its processes under the OCDM,
see 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 144-65.
115. Exec. Order No. 10995, §§ 3, 4, 3 C.F.R. § 535, 47 U.S.C. § 305
(1962). Later in 1962 subsection (d) was added to section 305 to give the
President authority to license foreign governments to operate low
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of the Office of Telecommunications Management (OTM) was
created within the OEP, with a general mandate to:
(a) Coordinate telecommunications activities of the executive
branch of the Government and be responsible for the formu-
lation after consultation with appropriate agencies of overall
policies and standards therefor. He shall promote and encour-
age the adoption of uniform policies and standards by agencies
authorized to operate telecommunications systems. Agencies
shall consult with the Director of Telecommunications Man-
agement in the development of policies and standards for the
conduct of their telecommunications activities within the overall
policies of the executive branch. (b) Develop data with regard
to United States Government frequency requirements .... (d)
Contract for studies and reports related to any aspect of his
responsibilities." 6
The Director was instructed to establish interagency advisory
committees and working groups composed of representatives of
interested agencies and consult with them as necessary. IRAC
was directed to serve the Director in an "advisory capacity" as
he "deems it necessary." 11-7 The order further expressly author-
ized the Director of OEP to redelegate to the OTM the responsi-
bility for frequency assignments and the authority under section
606. This redelegation followed." 8
Subsequent responsibilities delegated to the OTM include
"policy direction of the development and operation" of the Na-
tional Communications System which President Kennedy in 1963
ordered to be established to link together the communications
facilities and components of the various federal agencies." 9 The
Director is, in addition, an advisor and liaison between the Presi-
dent and Comsat.120 Finally, he is the Special Advisor to the
President on Telecommunications. 121
As presently organized, 22 the Office of Telecommunications
Management is comprised of five principal staff assistants and a
power radio stations at their legations or embassies in Washington.
This authority was subsequently delegated to the OEP by Exec. Order
No. 11084, 3 C.F.R. § 719, 47 U.S.C. § 305 (1963) and redelegated in turn
to the OTM.
116. Exec. Order No. 10995, § 2, 3 C.F.R. § 535, 47 U.S.C. § 305
(1962).
117. Id. § 5.
118. OEP Order No. 1100.
119. White House Memorandum, Aug. 21, 1963, 28 Fed. Reg. 9413(1963). The directive grew out of the Cuban missile crisis when Presi-
dent Kennedy found he was unable to contact U.S. ambassadors and
other U.S. representatives abroad.
120. Exec. Order No. 11191, § 2(b) (4), 3 C.F.R. § 273 (1965).
121. White House Memorandum, supra note 119.
122. For a current organization chart see Hearings on Government
Use of Satellite Communications Before the Military Operations Sub-
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legal counsel; three "directorates" which handle (a) national
communications, (b) research and technology, and (c) frequency
management; and two major committees, a Frequency Manage-
ment Advisory Council and IRAC. As of August, 1968, the staff
numbered less than 70 persons, of whom about half are clerical.
IRAC, subject to the direction and authority of the OTM Di-
rector, remains the primary organ for making routine frequency
assignments. IRAC is presently comprised of representatives of
the Departments of State, Treasury, Army, Navy, Air Force,
Interior, Agriculture, Justice, Commerce, Transportation (U.S.
Coast Guard and the FAA), the AEC, USIA, NASA and GSA.
Though these are the principal Government users of the spec-
trum, they are not the only users. Others, such as the Federal
Reserve Board, obtain representation on the Committee when
applying for an assignment. 123 The officers and subcommittee
members of IRAC are chosen by the OTM Director from the staff
of the Frequency Management Directorate.
The IRAC substructure consists of the FAS, the Technical
Subcommittee, the Spectrum Planning Subcommittee, the Inter-
national Notification Group, the Secretariat, two special groups-
the Aeronautical Assignment Group and the Military Assign-
ment Group-and ad hoc groups established as needed.
The detailed processes of frequency assignment are not as
easily described as the institutional structure. In marked con-
trast to the processes of the FCC, which are open to public
notice and, in some measure, to participation by "interested"
members of the industry and even the general public, those of
IRAC/OTM are not open to public view or public participation.
In 1965 the OTM did issue a "Manual of Regulations and Pro-
cedures for Radio Frequency Management," a codification of the
regulations, procedures and policy guidelines for the assignment
and use of frequencies. However, except for a few excerpts of
very general import, the manual is classified.
comm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 265 (1966). The discussion of the OTM and IRAC organization and
functions which follows is based principally on a memorandum furnished
by the OTM and draws also upon discussions with the Director and
staff members and with the FCC liaison representative.
123. The FCC has not been a member of IRAC since 1952, but the
FCC is represented on the full committee by a liaison. See text accom-
panying notes 128-29 infra. Also, somewhat curiously, the FCC does
have membership on the Frequency Assignment Subcommittee (FAS)
since its monitoring activities give it the status of a frequency user.
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Within the limits set by this classification the process is
described generally by the OTM as follows:
[T]he Government agency analyzes its mission to determine
communications-electronics requirements. Next, the agency
frequency manager examines applicable policies, rules, regu-
lations, frequency allocations, available equipment, frequencies
already available to the agency, and determines that frequency
support is possible before obligating funds for development or
procurement of communication-electronic equipment or station
sites. When it is evident that frequency support is not avail-
able without an impact on existing operations, the IRAC and/or
the DTM are consulted. When new types of communications-
electronics equipments are required an electromagnetic compat-
ibility analysis is made.., to determine whether there will be
an adverse impact upon existing operations....
In cases where frequency support is considered possible
without any electromagnetic incompatibility, the agency fre-
quency manager consults frequency assignment usage records,
makes the necessary technical studies, selects possible fre-
quencies, makes any required engineering evaluations, coor-
dinates the selection with the other agencies involved at the
local and headquarters level, and files an application with the
Executive Secretary of the IRAC. If the proposal is not tech-
nically compatible with existing authorizations, adjustments are
made or the process is repeated until a solution is found.
The FCC Liaison Representative to the IRAC submits
memoranda requests for coordination on non-Government use of
frequencies in shared frequency bands, and in other bands
where he considers that there might be incompatibility with
Government operations.
The IRAC Secretariat screens the applications for accuracy,
completeness, and compliance with procedures; assigns a docket
number for identification; includes the particulars on the Agenda
of the IRAC Frequency Assignment Subcommittee (FAS), in-
cluding an ADP interference analysis for high frequency use
when appropriate; and distributes a copy of the Agenda to
each agency and the FCC for study.
The Frequency Management Directorate, OTM, meanwhile
reviews the Government applications to ensure adequate justifi-
cation, compliance with policy and regulations, technical appro-
priateness, probability of major problems, and whether there is
a technical conflict with assignments of non-members of the
IRAC.
Each month the FAS... considers pending items and takes
agreed action within policy guidance. When policy guidance
is needed [or] agreement cannot be reached [or] the IRAC
has so directed, or an agency so requests, applications are re-
ferred to the IRAC .... Matters which cannot be resolved
within the IRAC ... or when so directed by the DTM, or
(when) requested by an agency, are referred to the Frequency
Management Directorate where they are resolved or referred to
the DTM. Matters of considerable importance, such as changes
to the Table of Frequency Allocations, significant Government
use of non-Government frequency bands, and advice to the
Department of State, are recommended to the DTM for consul-
tation with the Commission or other appropriate agencies ....
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As soon as possible after each FAS/FCC meeting, the IRAC
Secretariat enters the action into the Master Record, prepares,
has printed, and submits the list of Frequency Assignments to
Government Radio Stations to the DTM for consideration for
approval. Following DTM approval, distribution of the list is
made to the agencies.' 24
It should be noted that if a Government agency is greatly
dissatisfied with a decision of the OTM Director it can take the
matter to the President. This would be an extreme situation,
however, and the present Director has indicated that no such ap-
peal to the President has been made since he took office in 1964.125
As the individual assignment proceedings are classified, so,
of course, are the specific assignments themselves. However,
a general listing of the number of frequency assignments, as of
January, 1968, is given by the OTM as follows: 12
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124. OTM memorandum, supra note 122. The process appears to
be basically similar to that under the OCDM. See 1959 Hearings on
Spectrum Allocation at 144-65. For a description of the typical clear-
ance procedures within user agencies, see Coase at 22.
125. It is not known how many occasions there have been when
IRAC could not resolve an assignment matter creating the necessity for
a personal decision by the Director himself, or even by the Associate
Director. Reportedly there have been few such occasions.
126. OTM memorandum, supra note 122.
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(other than USCG & FAA) (119) (0.1)
Treasury 1,142 0.97
U.S. Capitol Police 3 0.003
United States Information Agency 1,162 0.99 10
Veterans Administration 138 0.117
Architect of the Capitol 1 0.001
Dual Listings (Q & W) 272 0.27
All Government Agencies 16 0.013
Other 100 0.085
Totals * (exclude figures in
parentheses) 117,973 100
Formerly, once assignments were made there was no sys-
tem for monitoring or periodic review to ascertain frequency
load or utilization. Indeed, there was no monitoring capability
for even the detection of interference. Such monitoring as was
done was by the FCC. The present Director has undertaken to
correct this. Contracts have been let for private interference
monitoring in selected locations. More important from the
standpoint of general spectrum management, the OTM has un-
dertaken a program of inspecting Government stations and re-
viewing frequency utilization with a view to making a complete
review of frequency usage every five years.127 The effectiveness
of this program and the sufficiency of OTM resources to carry
it out successfully have yet to be established.
C. COORDINATION BETWEEN FCC Am OTM/IRAC
Since the FCC and OTM have independent jurisdiction over
the same radio spectrum, obviously it has been necessary to es-
tablish means of coordinating their respective allocations ac-
tivities. From 1928 to 1952 such coordination was effected
through FRC/FCC membership on, and subsequent chairmanship
of, IRAC, despite some hostility on the part of federal agency
members to the FCC's role. 28 After 1952, the FCC established
liaison with IRAC which continues today. Liaison is the responsi-
bility of the Frequency Allocation and Treaty Division of the
Office of the Chief Engineer. The Assistant Chief Engineer and
other representatives of the Division sit on IRAC and on each
of its subcommittees, including the important FAS. FCC rep-
resentatives also attend meetings of the OTM's Frequency Man-
agement Advisory Council. 29
127. Id. The present Government list is to be made "current"
by 1972.
128. See note 22 supra, and accompanying text.
129. 33 FCC ANN. REP. 126-27 (1967).
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The need for coordination is more or less continuous. There
are some bands above 25 mc which have been allocated for
exclusive federal or nonfederal use by FCC-IRAC agreement;130
these do not necessitate routine coordination. However, all
of the bands below 25 mc and a large number of those above
are allocated for shared use. Prior to making allocations in these
bands, the FCC notifies the FAS to such effect. Similarly, fed-
eral agencies requesting frequencies in the shared bands notify
the FCC. The FCC also receives notification through its FAS
liaison representative. The FCC has no vote on executive assign-
ments and vice versa, but a negative reaction apparently does
result in the assignment being reviewed by the OTM Director.
In addition to routine allocations matters, coordination is
also necessary to resolve interference problems between private
and federal stations. These problems are resolved by liaison at
the subcommittee level.18 At the policy level the FCC main-
tains liaison directly with the Director of the OTM132 and it is at
this level that major allocations planning, such as adjustments in
the allocations for exclusive federal or nonfederal use, is con-
sidered.
IV. THE SYSTEM'S CRITICS AND THE CASE FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
As evidenced in the earlier resum6 of past critical studies
and reform proposals, the most enduring feature of radio spec-
trum regulation has been criticism of the regulatory processes
and an insistent call for reform. The following discussion is an
attempt to evaluate some of the central criticisms and the case
for administrative reform.
A. DuAL VERsus Ul-i'm CONTOL OF SPECTRUM ALLOCATIONS
To most critics, the central flaw of the regulatory system
has been the division of allocations authority between the FCC
and the executive, which allegedly is administratively inefficient
insofar as it requires continuous coordination, results in at least
partially overlapping functions and creates a potential for con-
flict between two agencies exercising "coequal" jurisdiction. In
130. The establishment of exclusive bands goes back to a 1940 FCC-
IRAC agreement (still in force), set forth in 1959 Hearings on Spectrum
Allocation at 124.
131. 33 FCC ANN. REP. 126 (1967).
132. Id. at 127.
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the judgment of a number of the critics, this division of author-
ity is conducive to the dominance of executive interests over pri-
vate interests in the use of the spectrum. 33 These criticisms
have furnished the basic rationale for proposals to eliminate the
division of authority and unify authority and responsibility in a
single agency, department, board or other form of "spectrum
czar."
1. Executive Control
Most advocates of unified authority have urged a single
executive agency or department. Various approaches have been
suggested. One possibility is simply to expand the present of-
fice of telecommunication management to give it central author-
ity to allocate frequencies within both the private and federal
government sectors. Alternatively, a separate office within the
Executive Office of the President could be established with
similar authority and responsibility.134
The proposal most frequently urged is the creation of an
"independent" executive "super board" or agency outside the
Executive Office of the President-again with authority to allo-
cate frequencies to federal and nonfederal users. Both the Sad-
owski proposal in 1950 and the Harris proposal in July, 1959,
would have substantially adopted such a scheme. 3 5 This is also
the evident thrust of the President's Task Force proposal. It
would establish a single "spectrum manager" in the executive
branch which would have full allocations authority and other
telecommunications policy and planning responsibilities. 13
An alternative to the "super board" is the creation of a cab-
inet-level "Department of Telecommunications" to take over the
allocation, policy and planning functions of the FCC, the Di-
133. See critical studies reviewed in pt. 1, 1215-23. See also M.ui-
TARY OPERATIONS SUBCOIV.nMr. OF T=E HOUSE CoMMnw. ON GOVERNMENT Op-
ERATIONS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 86, SATELLITE COmIcmmcATmONs (1964);
Coase at 20-40; Metzger & Burrus at 79-83; Rosenblum at 49, 53. The
President's Task Force draws similar conclusions as to the inefficiency
of dual jurisdiction although not apparently as to executive dominance.
See the summary of its findings in BROADCASTING MAGAzIE, Dec. 16,
1968, at 30-38.
134. Compare Statement of the present OTM Director in Hearings
on Government Use of Satellite Communications Before the Military
Operations Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1967).
135. See notes 30 & 74 supra, and accompanying text.
136. See BROADCASTING MAGAZImE, Dec. 16, 1968, at 36, 38.
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rector of the Telecommunications Management and IRAC.'37
These allocation and planning functions might also be vested in
an existing department such as the Department of Transpor-
tation.138 Proponents of these plans generally assume, however,
that the regulatory and licensing functions would remain with
the FCC or another independent agency.
To date, proposals to unify authority and responsibility for
private and Government frequency use within the executive have
not attracted widespread support. However, the recent endorse-
ment by the President's Task Force of the idea of unifying all
allocations authority in a single "spectrum manager" promises
to stimulate renewed study of such proposals. Since only brief
summaries of the Task Force report are now available it is
not possible here to discuss its findings in full detail, but the
general case which has been advanced for such a reorganization
can be examined.
(a) Administrative Efficiency
As a theoretical matter, I cannot disagree with those who
criticize the system of divided authority and responsibility on
grounds of inefficiency, since there are burdens of continuous
coordination and waste of manpower and agency resources in-
herent in the overlapping and duplication of functions.
However, the problem of administrative efficiency can be
exaggerated. If one examines the respective staffs and activities
of the FCC and the OTM, it is not evident that consolidation
would substantially reduce the effort currently required to make
allocations decisions. Because of the disparate interests and
problems reflected in allocations to Government agencies and
private users, apart from housekeeping details, there is little
promise of meaningful economy of effort-particularly when one
137. This appears to be the thrust of the proposal by Doyle, but
the discussion is too general to know precisely what is proposed. Doyle,
Do We Really Need a Federal Department of Telecommunications?
21 FED. Com. B.J. 3, 14-16 (1967).
138. Compare suggestions of the present Director in Hearings on
Government Use of Satellite Communications, supra note 134, at 72-73.
The proposal is to make the OTM, but not the FCC, a part of the
Department of Transportation, presumably assimilating both into DOT.
Congressman Dingell, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Regulatory
Agencies of the House Select Committee on Small Business, has re-
cently proposed legislation to transfer all allocations authority to the
Secretary of Commerce. BROADCASTING MAGAZINE, Jan. 13, 1969, at 36.
An alternative Dingell proposal would retain the dual jurisdiction but
reorganize regulation in the private sector. See note 229 infra.
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considers the already meagre staffs and resources committed to
spectrum management in these two agencies. 18 9
At the policy level some economies might be achieved by
the elimiation of the need for interagency policy coordination.
Yet, although some policy matters obviously affect both the Gov-
ernment and private sectors, there are many which do not. In
such cases any attempt to unify all policy judgment might result
in positive diseconomies. As pointed out by one observer:
If central control is instituted, the necessity of referring all
questions to the center involves expense in compiling and trans-
mitting information and delay before decisions can be made. 140
The problem here is not merely a problem of institutional size-
which in itself should probably not be a major concern-' 4 ' but
is rather the problem of effective, efficient central control over
the diversified interests reflected by all frequency users.
Finally, if one looks at the size of the FCC and the OTM,
whose combined appropriations in fiscal 1968 were only slightly
more than $21 million,'1 42 it must be asked whether administra-
tive efficiency is not a distinctly minor problem. For anyone
really concerned about efficiency and economy in government,
surely there are fatter fish to fry.
(b) Effective Overall Spectrum Management
A far more credible argument for unified authority is that
divided jurisdiction does not ensure adequate supervision over
spectrum utilization generally because there are no effective
means of ensuring fair, efficient, socially desirable division of
frequencies between Government and private use.143  Accord-
ing to some critics this has resulted in the Government-par-
ticularly the military-taking too much for itself. Occurrences
such as the Bendix incident, 44 where the FCC was "persuaded"
139. See note 243 infra.
140. Coase at 39. Coase evidently believes this true not only of
central authority over all federal and private users, but also of central
control over federal users alone.
141. Doyle, supra note 137, at 3, 15.
142. BuEAsur OF THE BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GovmmR-
MT 216, 420 (1968).
143. This is one of the basic conclusions of the President's Task
Force. See BROADCASTING MAGAzmE, Dec. 16, 1968, at 36. See also TELE-
cOmvMCATmONS: A PROGRAMI FOR PROGRESs at 204-06; Coase at 37;
Metzger & Burrus at 78-84; 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 34.
144. See Bendix Aviation Corp., Bendix Radio Div. v. FCC, 272 F.2d
533 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 965 (1960). Bendix involved
the reallocation of two frequency bands, 420-50 mc and 8500-9000 mc,
previously shared by private aviation and Government users. In April,
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to relinquish private frequencies to exclusive Government users,
is an often cited 145 example which tends to support the con-
clusion that the present system is, in practical effect, biased to-
wards the Government. On the other hand, FCC requests for
Government frequencies have been rejected.146  The recent ac-
tion of the OTM in releasing to the FCC for private use 26 mc
previously allocated exclusively to the Government 147 suggests
the possibility of a more enlightened cooperative arrangement
between the FCC and the executive than has prevailed heretofore.
But this unprecedented generosity does not alter the teaching
of the past: the system tends to favor Government users with-
out assuring that Government need is paramount to private need.
However, insofar as unreasonable discrimination against
private use has resulted from the present structure, it seems
naive to suppose that establishing central authority in the execu-
tive will alleviate the problem. It is far more likely that this
1958, the Office of Defense Mobilization, acting on behalf of the ex-
ecutive, urgently "requested" that the FCC withdraw these bands from
private use, thereby permitting exclusive Governmental use for "vital
defense" needs---"radiopositioning." The FCC granted the request and
issued an order withdrawing the frequencies from private use. Bendix
and others challenged the order on several grounds, including failure to
comply with the public notice provisions of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, failure to grant a hearing, and on the ground that the
Commission's reallocation of the frequencies was arbitrary. All of the
challenges were rejected, and the court upheld the Commission's ac-
tions as reasonable:
We are satisfied that the Commission, confronted by the de-
mands of the Executive for exclusive use of the frequency in
question, had thus undertaken to do whatever was reasonably
open to it in the light of national defense needs. . . . [T]he
Commission possesses the authority to ... accommodate the re-
quirements of the Government itself.
Id. at 542.
The principal criticism of the Commission's action in the Bendix
controversy is not that it acceded to the interests of national defense,
but rather that it appeared not to give any close scrutiny to the basis
for or validity of the defense claims asserted. See 1959 Hearings on
Spectrum Allocation at 87-88. Insofar as this may carry the implication
that the FCC did not know to what use the frequencies were to be put
or the general need for the frequencies, this criticism is probably un-
justified. In fact the Commission has access to information regarding
executive use and is not without some capability for ascertaining need.
Whether it might have been a little too "compliant" with executive
wishes in this case is another matter, but it is unknown since the court
honored the privilege asserted by the OCDM and held all particulars
to be secret information affecting national defense.
145. E.g., Coase at 29-30; Metzger & Burrus at 75-77.
146. A Commission request for VHF channels was turned down in
1956, see 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 138, and again in
1960, 26 FCC ARx. RaE . 44 (1960).
147. See note 101 supra.
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will only exacerbate it. First, even though the executive agency
having control would presumably not be a user, there would
likely be strong, continuous pressure by sister agencies and de-
partments to give them priority over competing private uses. And
in cases where the demand is represented to be of vital importance
to the federal government-particularly to national security or
foreign policy or other comparable high aims-it strains belief
to suppose that the allocation agency would presume to exam-
ine the demand with complete objectivity. There is likely to be
no more critically objective or carefully balanced judgment
than the FCC has rendered in acquiescing to the frequency de-
mands of the Government. Nor would the judgment be any
more subject to public scrutiny. Indeed, it could be less so.
In the Bendix case at least the existence of the conflict-if not
the particulars of the Government demands-was made public.
It is doubtful that even this would have been known had the
decision been made within a single, executive agency with in-
disputable jurisdiction. Second, even if such an agency at-
tempted to be completely objective and independent and gave
federal user demands the same critical, detached analysis that it
gave competing private users, the fact remains that the pretense
of independence would in the final accounting be largely just a
pretense, i.e., subject to presidential control, and dealing with
such giant users as the military, Department of State or NASA,
even a cabinet-level department of telecommunications would
not be complete master of its own house.
Apart from the possibility of achieving a more equitable
distribution between Government and private users of those
frequency bands which are allocated on an exclusive-use basis,
it has been contended that unifying allocations authority in a
single executive agency would facilitate cooperative sharing of
bands between executive users and private users. The Presi-
dent's Task Force study notes, for example, that certain Govern-
ment frequencies go largely unused in areas where private needs
are greatest; in such areas a sharing arrangement between Gov-
ernment and private users might alleviate the scarcity problem.
However, it also notes there is at present no single agency which
can make a decision implementing such a solution, and therefore
all allocations authority should be unified in a single executive
agency.1 48
Without disputing the Task Force findings as to the need
and feasibility of such sharings, I do not see how they lead to the
148. See BROADCASrIxo MGAZIn, Dec. 16, 1968, at 36.
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remedy proposed. The Task Force recommendation must rest
on two assumptions: (a) that the present system of divided
authority either precludes or hinders such a sharing arrangement,
and (b) that the creation of unified authority in the executive
would overcome whatever obstacles presently stand in the way
of such a sharing arrangement. Either of these assumptions
would seem difficult to substantiate. If such sharing is tech-
nically feasible, there is no reason to believe that private users
would object to sharing what are now exclusively Government
frequencies; nor does it seem probable that the FCC would
interpose any objection. The only source of objection would
seem to be the Government users and/or the OTM, which now
has full authority over Government allocations. The option
would thus seem to lie entirely with the executive even under the
present system of divided jurisdiction. It is thus difficult to see
what obstacle to a solution is presented by the present institu-
tional structure, and it is equally difficult to see how giving the
executive control over private allocations would remove what-
ever obstacles may presently exist. Arguably, unified authority
in a single agency might facilitate the formulation and implemen-
tation of the technical and other conditions and requirements of
such a sharing arrangement. But, why unify control in the
executive branch? Why not in an independent agency free of
the serious conflict-of-interest problems inherent in granting the
executive unqualified authority to manage the entire spectrum?
(c) Improved Allocations Within Private and Federal Sectors
If it is unlikely that unified executive allocations control
would bring about a better allocation of the spectrum between
federal and nonfederal users, it is even less likely that allocations
among federal or nonfederal users as a class would be improved
over the present system of divided FCC-executive authority. The
same considerations which lead to the expectation of continued
dominance of major federal users over nonfederal users leads
equally to the conclusion that among federal agencies, the major
agencies would predominate over those with less exalted mis-
sions but with perhaps equally important frequency needs. If
the Department of the Army, for example, made a demand for a
frequency band "in the interest of national security," it seems
highly improbable that a demand by the General Services Ad-
ministration for the same frequencies would fare any better
under such a system than would that of the VHF broadcasters
or private land mobile users.
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It has also been argued that the vesting of authority in an
executive agency would improve allocations among nonfederal
users. Although the Cooley Committee in 1959 concluded that
the FCC's allocations responsibilities were "well carried out,' 149
this is disputed by many of the FCC's critics. But whether one
accepts the Cooley Committee's judgment or that of FCC critics,
the FCC's performance seems of doubtful relevance to the pres-
ent issue.
Consider first the charge of bias. Nonbroadcast users in
particular have long felt that the FCC has been too broadcast
oriented'50 and have accordingly favored proposals to transfer
the FCC's allocations authority to an executive department.
Whether this criticism of FCC allocations policy is justified is
beyond the concern of this article. The point here is simply
that if such deficiencies do exist they can be altered with-
in the existing institutional framework. That a policy may
be deficient-even if it reflects a basic bias of the agency's mem-
bers-scarcely warrants reorganization unless it can be demon-
strated that the agency's performance is somehow the product of
a defective administrative form. This has not been demon-
strated. It is noteworthy that the Hoover Commission Task Force
on Regulatory Commissions, although critical of the FCC's per-
formance in a number of areas, concluded that these failures did
not reflect a flaw in the administrative form, and recommended
retention of the independent commission in its present form as
the appropriate agency for regulation in the field. 51 This con-
clusion seems no less correct as applied to the Commission's
handling of frequency allocations than it is as applied to its
149. 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocations at 50.
150. See, e.g., the criticism by one of the principal advocates for the
land mobile users:
In the band 25 - 890 megacycles (mc) ... we find less than
41 mc available for land mobile operations, 492 mc allocated
to TV, and 20 mc allocated to FM broadcasting. This alloca-
tion-41 mc versus 512 mc-is regarded by the mobile radio
services as grossly unsatisfactory and unfair and is, in the
legal sense, arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory.
Courtney, The Double Standard, 20 FED. Com. B.J. 152-53 (1966). See
also Courtney & Blooston, Development of Mobile Radio Communica-
tions-The "Work-Horse" Radio Services, 22 LAW & CONTEMn. PROB.
626 (1957), criticizing the FCC's allocations policies and also its policy of
licensing land mobile users on a nonprotected, party-line basis.
151. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE ExEcuTvE BRANCH or
THE GOVERNMENT COAnITTEE ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COIUMS-
sIONs, TAsK FORCE REPORT 96 (1949). See also the supporting STAFF
REPORT ON =nE FCC 22 (1948), which concluded that the defects which
it found "do not appear to be inherent in the Commission form."
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regulatory responsibilities in general. If, as sometimes charged,
the Commission is "biased" toward broadcasters, I cannot
understand how the Commission's particular form or organi-
zation has contributed to it. Certainly the FCC's status as an
independent agency .does not inherently incline it to one par-
ticular group or another or immunize it from legal or political
change. If Congress or the courts directed the Commission to
give higher priority to nonbroadcast users, surely it would be
done. There has been no such directive despite occasional state-
ments of dissatisfaction by some Congressmen. Indeed, it seems
fair to say that Congress has been no less preoccupied with broad-
casting than has the FCC.
Further, and most important, insofar as it reflects an at-
tempt to purge the FCC of bias, elimination of the FCC's inde-
pendent status and reconstitution of its allocations functions
and responsibilities within the executive is not likely to result
in any real purification of the administrative process. It may
be noted that the criticism of special interest bias is not one
uniquely directed at the FCC; it is a criticism which has been
leveled at the independent regulatory agencies generally, and
urged as a reason for abolishing them and revesting their author-
ity in the executive, where it will not be dominated by special
interest groups. 152 However, Professor Jaffe seems entirely cor-
rect in his statement that this sweeping attack "transcend[s]
analysis.' 153 It is more ideological than analytical. Jaffe notes:
[Ijndustry representation is not peculiar to the agencies. It
is to my mind not a little curious that the critics limit their
examination of this phenomenon to the independent agency. I
would suppose that it was necessary first to establish the execu-
tive agencies as the norm and then to show how the independent
agencies tend to depart from that norm. Yet anyone who fol-
lows the activities of the Department of Agriculture, for exam-
ple, comes to feel (though this too is no doubt an exaggeration)
that the Department is a glorified farmer's lobby. 54
Other examples might be added to Jaffe's. Few would suppose
that the Commerce Department is other than strongly loyal to,
if not an apologist for, business, or that the Labor Department is
other than pro-labor or that the Highway Administration is not
warmly responsive to highway interests. Moreover, such loyal-
ties are not confined to executive agencies with largely "pro-
152. E.g., M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BusImss n w INDEPENDENT COm-
vssiox (1955).
153. Jaffe, Book Review, 65 YALE L.J. 1068, 1076 (1956).
154. Id. at 1071.
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motional" responsibilities. Consider, for example, the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare's Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, whose empathy with the drug industry has been the
subject of intensive criticism by many, including Congress. 155
It is possible, moreover, that placing full authority in the
executive might have the effect of enhancing special interest bias
and making it less observable and less subject to public or Con-
gressional correction. This possibility is suggested by experience
with the process of executive decisions in the international air
carrier field. 15 Indeed, the susceptibility of the executive to the
same pressures, influences and biases to which the FCC is subject
is compounded by the fact that, as a user of frequencies, the
executive has its own inherent bias favoring federal uses over
nonfederal users.
2. Independent Agency Control
Many of the conflict-of-interest problems which militate
against unifying authority in the executive might be eliminated
by vesting unified authority in the FCC. This possibility was con-
sidered in the Stewart Report in 1951, but was rejected on the
grounds that the FCC would not be accepted as an impartial
arbiter, and that such a scheme would improperly intrude upon
executive power, particularly in the fields of foreign relations
and national defense.157
(a) The Objections on Principle
Analytically, the objections to unified FCC authority are not
entirely convincing. First, contrary to the suggestion that the
FCC might not be accommodating to federal users, the history of
FCC-executive relations suggests that the FCC may have been
too accommodating to federal users. 5 8 However, the Stewart
Report suggests that whether or not the FCC would be an "ob-
155. See M. M.bTz, TRm THERAPEUTIC NIGHTMARE 93-146 (1965).
One critic succinctly characterized the attitude of the FDA under
former Commissioner George Larrick as "one of sweetness and light,
togetherness, of loving one's neighbor [industry and Congress] as
one's self." Quoted id. at 95.
156. See notes 167-72 infra, and accompanying text.
157. TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A PROGRAM FOR PROGRESS at 196-97. Fol-
lowing release of the Board's Report, a bill to vest full allocations au-
thority in the FCC was introduced in the House but seems to have gone
nowhere. See 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 135.




jective" arbiter, it would not be accepted as such. This seems
an inadequate basis for rejecting control by an independent
agency. It is clear that the establishment of any effective control
on executive uses would not be warmly greeted by those whose
interests are adversely affected.
In any event, there are executive controls. First, a measure
of control is inherent in the presidential nomination of FCC mem-
bers. While this is not an effective means of ensuring day-to-
day control, it does seem adequate to assure that FCC members
are receptive and responsive to federal government needs in the
long run. Second, it is assumed that the presidential emergency
powers as set forth in section 606 of the Communications Act
would be retained.
The objection that unified FCC authority would constitute
an unwise intrusion upon presidential prerogatives with respect
to national defense and foreign policy is also unconvincing.
Radio frequencies are, of course, vital to the military, and fre-
quency allocations decisions are therefore obviously important to
national defense. But this is true of countless other activities-
for example, the manufacture of steel-which are not committed
to the exclusive control of the executive as matters of presidential
prerogative. Similarly the need for international agreement on
radio frequency allocations ties such allocations to foreign affairs,
but no more so than international trade, which is committed to
presidential prerogative.
It has even been suggested that the allocation and control of
frequencies to federal users, at least insofar as national defense
and foreign policy is concerned, is constitutionally vested in the
President, that the Act of 1934 and its predecessors merely recog-
nized this authority.159 Whatever the ambit of the intrinsic
constitutional powers of the President, it would scarcely appear
this broad. 60 It is difficult to take seriously the suggestion that
Congress could not exercise its own constitutional prerogatives
to dispose of and control federal resources or otherwise regulate
interstate commerce, or to delegate it to an agency of its choice,
thereby divesting the President of authority.' 6' In any event,
159. 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 59, 61 (statements of
Mr. Everitt).
160. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
161. See id. at 593, 602 (concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter);
id. at 655, 660 (concurring opinion of Justice Burton).
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any possible constitutional necessity for giving the President
authority is satisfied by his emergency powers under section 606
of the Act.
Wholly apart from these separation-of-powers consider-
ations, it has been contended by one critic of the FCC that al-
though unified allocations authority is desirable and should be
separated from presidential direction, the FCC is not a fitting
repository in view of its poor performance in exercising its exist-
ing regulatory authority. Accordingly, a new independent agency
should be established to exercise FCC and executive alloca-
tions. 1 -2 Concededly, the FCC's performance has in many
areas been deficient, but as pointed out above,'163 the deficiencies
have not demonstrated any fatal institutional flaw, and there is
no reason to suppose that a newly created agency-within or
without the executive branch-will be any less susceptible to the
ills that have beset the FCC.
(b) Practical Problems
Although the objections to vesting full allocations authority
in the FCC are analytically unconvincing, a sense of the practical
indicates that they nevertheless would certainly prevail to
defeat any such proposal. Given the present system of mili-
tary and foreign policy priorities and the executive prerogatives
of implementation, it is unreal to expect that the FCC, or any
independent agency, would be given the proposed authority.164
Indeed, to divest the executive of powers which are asserted to
be vital to national defense, foreign policy and other important
executive functions would, I think, require nothing less than
heroic effort by Congress, even were the spirit willing.
Although a vesting of complete and final allocations author-
ity in the FCC might be precluded by practical politics, a recent
proposal by Professors Metzger and Burrus might be politically
162. Rosenblum at 53-54. Compare the recent proposal by FCC
Commissioner Bartley to create a "Telecommunications Resources Au-
thority" within the Legislative Branch. "Let's Abolish the FCC," Ad-
dress by Commissioner Robert Bartley before the fllinois Broadcaster's
Association, May 23, 1968, FCC Release No. 17280. See notes 228-41
infra, and accompanying text.
163. See notes 150-56 supra, and accompanying text.
164. It is probable that the FCC would not welcome such author-
ity. The Commission opposed such a bill in 1951. 1959 Hearings on
Spectrum Allocation at 135.
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acceptable. Concluding that unified FCC authority would be pre-
ferable to the other unification proposals, they support vesting
initial authority in the FCC. But, in order to assure that "security
considerations have a 'proper voice' in the determination of fre-
quency allocations," this authority would be subject to review
and final decision by the President at the request of the Director
of Telecommunications Management.
165
While this proposal might make FCC authority politically
acceptable, it does so by extracting from the FCC the very inde-
pendence the need for which precipitated the placement of this
authority somewhere other than in the executive in the first place.
In effect the executive would be left with full control-a control
which could only have the result of continuing the preferred
status of federal users. Metzger and Burrus concede this might
be a possibility but dismiss it as an insignificant problem:
For if Congress were to legislate the changes in the Federal
Communications Act which would be necessary to create the
system herein recommended, it would be making it quite clear
to all agencies and to the President that it expected the FCC's
frequency allocation determination to be the final decision ex-
cept in the unusual case where the President, upon the care-
fully considered advice of his DTM, was convinced that an
important national interest urgently demanded that the FCC be
overridden. In consequence it is very doubtful that the DTM
would seek to have the President overturn every FCC deter-
mination which might be less than satisfactory to the request-
ing federal agency, and still more unlikely that the President
would do so even were he so advised.166
This conclusion seems rather overidealized in its assumptions
regarding the workings of the executive in general and the antici-
pated presidential deference to vague congressional restrictions
on executive prerogative in particular. To suggest that the Presi-
dent would override an FCC decision only when some "important
national interest" was at stake is simply to hide behind a phrase.
"Important national interest" is as flexible as "public interest,
convenience and necessity;" who can say what it encompasses?
Of course, one would not expect every frustrated federal user
automatically to seek White House review. But any user agency
which believes strongly in the importance of its frequency appli-
cation will find little in the phrase "important national interest"
to deter it from pressing its claim as far as possible. Nor is it
likely that channeling such appeals through the OTM will
165. Metzger & Burrus at 92-94.
166. Id. at 94.
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greatly alter the situation. If the Department of the Army, for
example, strongly desired review of an adverse FCC decision, it
seems naive to suppose that the OTM would oppose review, or
could in any event preclude it. And if the Secretary of the
Army, through the OTM or over its opposition, seeks reversal of
an FCC allocation I would not look for the FCC to emerge vic-
torious whatever the merits of the case from an objective view-
point. In short, it seems improbable that this scheme would
prove any different in ultimate effect than giving full authority
to the executive in the first instance.
The Metzger-Burrus proposal might well produce a situation
similar to that in the certification of overseas and foreign air
transport. Under the Federal Aviation Act such functions as the
issuance, denial, transfer, amendment, and suspension of certifi-
cates for overseas or foreign air transport are subject to the ap-
proval of the President. 16 7 The presidential authority is para-
mount; his decision is absolute and immune from judicial re-
view. 68 With such powers the White House'6 9 has become in
effect a decision-maker rather than a reviewer. Moreover, the
White House has not been reluctant to exercise its authority, and
from a number of notable instances it is evident that the White
House decisions, which need not be explained or justified, are
often made on grounds unrelated to foreign policy or other
"national interest" considerations which provided the basis for
granting this power to the President. 7 0
Perhaps the most significant aspect of this scheme is that
there is no effective restraint on the exercise of the White House
authority. No matter how demonstrably wrong the decision-
167. 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
168. Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103 (1948). The Board's action was held similarly unreviewable in
Waterman on the ground that otherwise, until the President acted,
there could be no final order. Id. at 112-13. However, recent lower
court decisions have created an exception to this rule of nonreview-
ability when the Board is found to have acted outside its statutory
authority. E.g., Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 380 F.2d
770 (2d Cir. 1967); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 348 F.2d 349 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
169. "White House" more properly defines the repository of the au-
thority, since the President personally is not commonly involved in
the decisions. H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL Ai1uNSTRAIvn AGENcIEs 154
(1962).
170. See Landis, Meddling From the White House, N.Y. Herald-
Tribune, March 20, 1958, at 18, excerpted in W. GEL m¢oN & C. BysE,
CASES ON AMINsTRAVE LAw 996-99 (4th ed. 1960).
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indeed, no matter how palpable an abuse of authority-there is
no review17' and in most cases not even public scrutiny. Not
only has this power of White House "approval" been used to
substitute secret, executive fiat for open, reasoned decision-mak-
ing in the matter of international air routes, it has provided a
basis for White House meddling in domestic air routes as well,
even though the White House lacks statutory authority in this
latter area. 72
The case for unification is not made stronger by the analo-
gies which Metzger and Burrus invoke. They point out that prior
to the Federal Aviation Act,17 3 responsibility for air safety was
divided between the executive and the CAB in much the same
manner that frequency allocations authority is now divided.17 4
This bifurcated authority proved inadequate to assure air safety
and this led to the vesting of unified air safety control in a
single independent agency, the FAA. The successful unifica-
tion of authority in the FAA might appear to offer support
for the soundness of their proposal. 17 5 The crucial difference,
171. See TWA v. CAB, 184 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1950).
172. See Landis, supra note 170. Such White House intermeddling
is suggested in Western Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 351 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir.
1965). The Board, in an airline route proceeding to consider additional
trans-Pacific service to Hawaii and beyond, released two decisions.
One related to service to Hawaii-a domestic route not subject to pres-
idential approval-and a second to service beyond Hawaii-an interna-
tional route subject to presidential approval. The Board awarded new
domestic route authority and recommended to the President the award
of new international routes. The White House rejected the Board's
recommendation regarding the International routes and, in its notifica-
tion to the Board, expressed the "hope" that the additional authority
between the mainland and Hawaii would be reconsidered. The Board
thereupon terminated the domestic route proceeding and Western's
award was not allowed to become effective. The only explanation was
that the domestic and international aspects were "intimately inter-
twined"--a fact not supported by the record and which apparently
went unnoticed until the White House expressed its "hope" for a termi-
nation of the route award. Although the court of appeals fortunately
reversed the Board's termination order, the case remains as an example
of the dangers inherent in the vesting of regulatory authority in the
White House when such authority is subject to rules other than its own
sense of propriety.
173. 72 Stat. 731 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1301-1657 (Supp.
1968).
174. Metzger & Burrus at 86-89.
175. The control of air safety by the FAA does, of course, entail a
degree of control over private and federal use, but it does not entail the
granting or denial of use itself. A communications analogy would not
be the power to allocate frequencies, but rather, for example, the
power to impose regulations concerning type of transmitters or regula-
tions governing operation of transmitters to curb interference.
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however, is that when unified authority was vested in the FAA,
it was not subject to presidential review or approval as pro-
posed for frequency allocations. 176 The appointment of a mili-
tary man as Deputy Administrator to represent the military
establishment does not change the fact that the "military repre-
sentative" had no independent authority, no right to appeal to
the President and, indeed, was expected to have first loyalty
to the agency.177 Of course, with the reorganization of the
FAA into the Department of Transportation, unified control
has now shifted to the executive' 78-a shift which Metzger and
Burrus themselves would evidently agree would not be wise
in the case of frequency allocations for reasons discussed earlier.
The second analogy which Metzger and Burrus draw in sup-
port of their proposal is the regulation of the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC). Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,179
the AEC has broad regulatory and licensing powers over vir-
tually all activity relating to the development, use and control
of atomic energy. Because of the obvious importance of atomic
energy to the military, the Act provides that:
The Commission shall advise and consult with the Department
of Defense .... If the Department of Defense at any time
concludes that any request, action, proposed action, or failure to
act on the part of the Commission is adverse to the responsi-
bilities of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense
shall refer the matter to the President whose decision shall
be final.'8 0
The control of atomic energy is not, however, analogous to the
present problem. First, the authority to refer AEC decisions to
the President for final decision is limited to decisions which are
adverse to the responsibilities of the Department of Defense.
Those matters to be considered Defense responsibilities are lim-
ited to:
military applications of atomic weapons or atomic energy in-
cluding the development, manufacture, use, and storage of
atomic weapons, the allocation of special nuclear material for
military research, and the control of information relating to the
176. Also, it should be emphasized that the actions of the FAA
continue to be subject to judicial review and control, 49 U.S.C. § 1655
(c) (Supp. 1968), which would not evidently be the case under the Metz-
ger and Burrus proposal giving the President final decisional authority.
177. See 49 U.S.C. § 1343 (a) (2) (1964). See also H.R. REP. No. 2360,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958).
178. 49 U.S.C. § 1655 (c) (Supp. 1968). Executive control is not com-
plete, however. See 49 U.S.C. § 1654(f) (Supp. 1968).
179. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1964).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2037 (1964).
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manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons .... 181
Second, the mere fact that the military and the President possess
certain prerogatives with respect to atomic energy development
means little. It is necessary to know something about the success
of this system. Unfortunately, Metzger and Burrus do not in-
form us how the Presidential prerogative in the AEC example
has worked: whether it has, for example, resulted in giving the
military an undue influence in atomic energy development, or
whether-as they imply-it has not. Without attempting to ex-
plore this question here, two points might be noted: First, un-
like the situation in the radio communications field there is no
inherent conflict between civilian and military aims in the use
and development of atomic energy. Indeed, in its early years the
AEC's primary function was that of a "weaponer for the mili-
tary.'' 82  While this narrow purpose has been expanded to in-
clude civilian use since 1954,183 it has been said that "the weapons
program remains the firm anchor which gives the Commission a
sense of security concerning its role on the national scene. ' us 4
Second, where conflicts have arisen between military and civilian
atomic energy programs-as over the establishment of priorities
-the military seems to have generally, if not invariably, pre-
vailed.18 5 I do not suggest here that either of the above are
the results of presidential prerogative or undue subordination of
civilisninterests to military programs. But these considerations
do indicate that the AEC example is not a persuasive precedent
for executive review of FCC radio allocations.
181. Id. The Senate Report on the Predecessor Act of 1946, sub-
stantially similar in this regard, indicates that referral was to be con-
fined to these matters. See S. REP. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1946).
182., H. ORLANS, CONTRACTING FOR AToMs 4, 204 (1967).
183. H. GREN & A. RosENTmL, GOVERNMENT OF THE ATOM: THE
INTEGRATION OF PowERs 252-54 (1963).
184. Quoted in H. ORLANS, supra note 182, at 204. See also D.
LuzENTHAL, CHANGE, HoPE Am THE BoMB 115-16 (1963) (emphasis
added):
The AEC functions chiefly as a designer, developer, maker, and
tester of atomic weaponry. . . . [A]s the reason for a sharp
separation between civilian and military atomic roles has faded,
so the distinctive role of the AEC has changed. The AEC as
weaponer has in fact become very much a part of the military
establishment, serving the needs and goals of that military
establishment as defined by the military .... Realistically,
the AEC essentially is not too different from any major tech-
nical contractor to the Defense Department in the area of
missiles ... or some other weapons system.
185. See H. Orlans, supra note 182, at 175-78.
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B. REFORM WInN THE PRESENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF
DUAL FCC-ExEcUTV AUTHORITY
After a brief review of the frequency allocation problem, the
Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Government Operations in 1964 concluded that "dual control...
seems to be a permanent feature, and therefore the need is one
of better coordination and administration."'8 6 Based on pre-
viously explored considerations, this conclusion seems correct not
only as a practical assessment of political realities but also as a
statement of normative principle. It remains therefore to con-
sider the possibilities of institutional improvement within the
present allocations framework.
1. Reorganization of Executive Authority
Finding that a central problem lay with the management of
frequency allocations among federal users, the Stewart Report
in 1951 concluded that the first necessary step in reform was the
creation of a Telecommunications Advisory Board within the
Executive Office of the President, which would exercise positive
management over governmental allocations and use. The Ad-
visory Board would then cooperate with the FCC in dividing the
spectrum between Government and non-Government users and
in planning general spectrum utilization. 87
The Office of Telecommunications Advisor was subsequently
created and given substantially the responsibilities outlined by
the Stewart Report. Although the office showed early promise
of improvement in executive management, the position was later
downgraded by transfer of its functions to the ODM, and later
to the OCDM.188  That the impairment of the Telecommuni-
cations Advisor's effectiveness is attributable solely to these sub-
sequent reorganizations seems doubtful. Rather, the reorgani-
zations merely reflect a more basic problem-lack of real presi-
dential concern over the need for strong, central management
and control of executive frequency allocations and use. Congress
proved to be no more responsive to this need. When the Bowles
and Cooley Committees advocated stronger central management
186. MILITARY OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE COnMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., SATELLITE COM-
MUNICATIONS 86 (1964).
187. See notes 39-48 supra, and accompanying text.
188. See notes 54 & 55 supra, and accompanying text.
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authority in accordance with the Stewart Report recommen-
dations, the response was discussion without action.5 9 In 1962,
the present Office of Telecommunications Management was
created in the Office of Emergency Planning. However, this
has not appreciably quieted the critics who insist that little has
changed.190
In terms of formal power, the delegation of frequency assign-
ment authority to the OTM is somewhat broader than that dele-
gated the Telecommunications Advisor, and subsequently to the
OCDM, in 1951. Whereas the latter delegation is couched in
terms of "advising and assisting" the President, the OTM is
authorized to act for the President. In this respect the scope of
the formal OTM delegation is at least as broad as that proposed
by the Stewart Report, so often raised as the standard.'19 Prac-
tically, the difference between "advising and assisting" and act-
ing for the President may seem a thin one.1 92 However, it has
been suggested that there is inadequate authority to control
federal users effectively. If this ever was a problem, it scarcely
seems a problem today, since the delegation of authority to the
OTM under the 1962 reorganization clearly provides adequate
authority.
But other factors have retarded the effectiveness of the OTM.
The first Director, Dr. Stewart, resigned after a little more than
a year in office because, it is said, "he couldn't convince any-
body why he was at the White House,"'193 because he could not
get the money he needed, and because of reported difficulties
with the military. 9 4 For a year after Stewart's resignation the
post remained vacant-a circumstance scarcely conducive to ef-
fective development of the OTM. In April, 1964, the present
Director, Lieutenant General James D. O'Connell-retired head
189. See notes 60-74 supra, and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Doyle, Do We Really Need a Federal Department of
Telecommunications? 21 FED. COm. BJ. 3, 14 (1967); Metzger & Burrus
at 45.
191. Stewart, Telecommunications Management: The Strategy of
Organizational Location, 23 PUB. ADm. REv. 149, 151 (1963). Stewart
states that in 1962 the delegation actually went beyond what was pro-
posed in 1951, but a careful reading of the 1951 report of the Com-
munications Policy Board indicates that the proposed advisor's formal
authority and responsibilities would have been substantially similar.
192. However, Dr. Stewart mentioned the distinction. Id.
193. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1966) (re-
marks of Senator Pastore).
194. BROADCASTNG MAGAzIN, April 22, 1963, at 5.
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of the Army Signal Corps-was appointed.19 5
Whether there has now developed an adequate vehicle
for effective spectrum management is an open question. Be-
cause of the record of executive frequency management one is
inclined to view the OTM's own list of accomplishments and its
future plans and programs 9 6 with some skepticism. Neverthe-
less, it is possible to be too cynical and thus ignore the existence
of some important organizational improvements since 1964.
These include tigher control over IRAC processes, increased con-
trol over assignments and technical standards and an ambitious
program of reviewing agency utilization. Whether these and
other measures will be permanently successful in achieving
more effective executive spectrum management and use is un-
certain. However, many of them are similar to those contem-
plated by the Stewart Report in 1951, and do represent important
steps forward.
There is nevertheless a case for more basic reorganization of
the executive management function. Several executive struc-
tures have been suggested by Director O'Connell which generally
parallel the proposals for unifying FCC and executive authority,
except that the dual FCC-executive jurisdiction would continue:
One alternative is to leave the office as it is-which has
certain disadvantages.... OEP is in a different line of work.
They are concerned with emergency planning; accordingly, they
have somewhat different interests and are guided by different
priorities.
Another alternative is to make the office a part of the De-
partment of Transportation. This . . . presents a great many
problems. There are bound to be difficulties in developing an
overall set of national policies in a situation where one de-
partment is charged with coordinating the communications
policy of others. Also there could be conflicts of interest if one
user of the spectrum were in a position to exercise the Presi-
dent's authority over all of the other departments.
The third alternative is to combine Telecommunications
with the Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Of-
fice of the President. The two offices have similar responsi-
bilities in considering the impact of research and the pace of
technology on national policy...
The fourth alternative is to create a separate agency re-
porting directly to the President.197
195. MILITARY OPERATIONS SUBCOMM TTEE, supra note 186, at 83.
196. See OFFICE OF TELECOMIUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT, REPORT ON
FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE ExEcUTIVE BRANCH OF THE Gov-
ERNMENT 16-17 (1966).
197. Hearings on Government Use of Satellite Communications
Before the Military Operations Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government
Operations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73 (1967).
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(a) The Need for Reorganization
With respect to the alternative of retaining the present OTM
structure, General O'Connell's views on the tenuous relationship
between OTM and OEP seem valid, although major change
would probably not be warranted were it not for other, stronger
considerations. First, there is the matter of budget and staff-
ing. The current budget of less than $2 million and staff of less
than 70 persons 9 " seem woefully inadequate to achieve and
maintain effective management of Government frequency assign-
ments and use. In this vein it is noteworthy that the inability
to obtain adequate funds was a major factor in Dr. Stewart's
resignation as Director in 1963.199 A significant contributing fac-
tor to this disability, according to Dr. Stewart, is the location of
the OTM in the OEP with the result that "its financial support
is affected by the Congressional response to the needs of the
total OEP operation. '200 While it is true that the OTM budget
is identified and justified independently of the OEP's, 20 1 as long
as the OTM remains without a visible identify of its own, it can
be expected that its budget will conform to that of the OEP gen-
erally; the total OEP appropriation for fiscal 1969, including that
of the OTM, is less than $10 million.202
A second consideration underscoring the need for reorgani-
zation is the need to enhance the prestige and stature of the
office and its functions. This need was viewed by the Stewart
Report in 1951 as a central one: the aim was to provide a di-
rector who "was right next door to the President, [who] ...
had the ear of the President-nobody ... between him and
the President. 20 3 When the Office of Telecommunications Ad-
visor was created in 1951 there was no intervening agency be-
tween it and the President. However, President Eisenhower
felt that too many persons were reporting directly to the Pres-
ident, and shifted the Advisor's functions to the ODM, and later
to the OCDM.204 The obvious result was a reduction in the of-
fice's stature and importance. As Dr. Stewart has noted:
198. The staff figure includes clerical help.
199. Stewart, supra note 191, at 154.
200. Id.
201. Hearings, supra note 197, at 74.
202. Independent Offices and Department of Housing and Urban
Development Appropriation Act of 1969, 82 Stat. 937. The OTM's 1969
appropriation is $1,675,000, of which $500,000 is earmarked for research.
203. 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 78 (remarks of Dr.
Stewart).
204. Stewart, supra note 191, at 151.
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[t] he direct contact with the President which was the source
of strength for the office was lost and with it much of the
benefit which had been sought by the Communications Policy
Board.205
This prestige and stature must be re-established if the OTM is
to function effectively, particularly in dealing with high level
executive agencies such as the State and Treasury Departments,
NASA and-most of all-the military establishment. So long as
the OTM remains a mere adjunct of the OEP, with its respon-
sibilities at least partially submerged in that office, the develop-
ment of a strong, independent and prestigious body is jeopar-
dized.
(b) The Reorganization Alternatives
What kind of reorganization is best suited to these aims?
The present Director has suggested three other possible alter-
natives: 20 6 transferring the OTM to the Department of Trans-
portation (DOT), merging the OTM and the Office of Science
and Technology or creating a new office. These do not neces-
sarily exhaust all of the possibilities, but they state the basic
alternatives.
(1) OTM as Part of the Department of Transportation
A transfer of the OTM to DOT seems the least attractive
possibility. The only discernible connection between telecom-
munications management and the functions of DOT is that DOT,
particularly the FAA, is a major federal user of frequencies. But
far from being a reason for assimilation of the OTM into DOT,
this is one of the most persuasive reasons against it. As Gen-
eral O'Connell acknowledges, this would create a major conflict
of interest. Even apart from this problem, however, it is diffi-
cult to envision how this scheme would serve the aims of es-
tablishing the independent identity and enhancing the prestige
of the OTM. The assumption underlying such a proposed trans-
fer appears to be that it would extend the prestige and impor-
tance of a cabinet-level position to the OTM, thereby further
strengthening it. But this is highly questionable. Consider first
the relationship between OTM and DOT in terms of present
budget alone. The appropriation for DOT for fiscal 1969 ex-
ceeds $6 billion; OTM's is less than $2 million, less than half
205. Id.
206. See text accompanying note 197 supra.
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the budget for one of DOT's smaller offices, the National Trans-
portation Safety Board.20 7 The transfer of the OTM to DOT
is likely to result in little more than the creation of another
bureau or office in an immense administrative superstructure.
OTM would be placed on a par with such subordinate offices
as the Safety Board, the Federal Railroad Administration, or
at best the Highway Administration. Far from enhancing or
establishing a visible identity for telecommunications manage-
ment, such a transfer would probably bury that which now
exists. If the present subordination of OTM to OEP has im-
paired its ability to attract needed budget support, only greater
impairment can result from forcing the OTM to compete with
such departments as the FAA or the Highway Administration,
both of which possess strong political support.
Finally, even assuming that the OTM could maintain a
substantial independent identity and importance within DOT,
the assumption that it could effectively carry out its present
responsibilities must be questioned. In 1946 a study conducted
for the Bureau of the Budget discouraged the placing of allo-
cations control in a single department because "the regulation of
one department by another generally has been quite unsuccess-
ful. °2 0 8  While there are no doubt exceptions, this appraisal
seems valid insofar as it applies to the situation in which one
"independent" executive agency or department has authority to
regulate important functions of another. If so, an attempt to
give DOT the responsibility of assigning and managing the use
of radio frequencies by other agencies such as NASA, the State
Department or the military service agencies, will not produce
the kind of strong central management that is needed.
More probably the "management" will degenerate into the type
of "cooperative coordination" which has characterized the work of
IRAC and resulted in a failure to bring about a more effective
management of executive use of the spectrum. This problem
does not necessarily exist, however, if the regulating agency is
located in the Executive Office of the President and speaks with
his direct authority and support. The authoritative influence
wielded by the Bureau of the Budget is a case in point, and this
is the rationale of the Stewart Report's recommendation for
207. Department of Transportation Appropriation Act of 1969, 82
Stat. 654; Independent Offices and Department of Housing and Urban
Development Appropriation Act of 1969, 82 Stat. 937.
208. 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation at 132.
1236 [Vol. 53:1179
RADIO SPECTRUM REGULATION
locating the telecommunications advisor as close to the Presi-
dent as possible.
(2) Combining the OTM with the Office of Science and
Technology
The merger of the OTM and the Office of Science and Tech-
nology (OST) offers some advantages: it would keep the OTM
within the Executive Office of the President, and it would
strengthen its technological research capability. However, such
a merger seems ill-designed to meet the essential aims of re-
organization. If the OTM is to accomplish more efficient, effec-
tive utilization of the spectrum by executive agencies, its primary
function must be an operational, not a research, function. It
must manage the use of the spectrum; it must be designed to
facilitate and implement authoritative decision-making in the
assignment of frequencies, and the establishment of use prior-
ities. A merger with the OST might tend to obscure these man-
agement responsibilities through an excessive emphasis on tech-
nological research. Scientific research has not yet been able to
eliminate the core problem of spectrum scarcity and seems un-
likely to do so in the foreseeable future; also science cannot
establish priorities among competing users with technologically
equivalent claims.
Moreover, even conceding the need for more research as an
adjunct of policy planning and use management, there is nothing
uniquely important in the research capability of the OST. Since
its concern goes far beyond telecommunication technology 2 9 only
a portion of OST's capability would be useful to telecommuni-
cations. More important, however, in terms of money com-
mitted to telecommunications research, various other executive
agencies already spend several times as much on telecommuni-
cations research as the OST spends on its entire research effort.210
Thus, even if additional research capability is as important
as seems to be implied in the proposal for merger with OST,
one can think of better partners for the OTM than the Office of
Science and Technology.
(3) Establishment of an Independent Office
The only satisfactory alternative to the present OTM struc-
209. See Hearings, supra note 197, at 74-75.
210. Cf. Stewart, supra note 191, at 154.
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ture is the establishment of an independent office. Since the
OTM is largely an autonomous entity within the OEP, such a
reorganization need entail little if any additional overhead costs.
Any additional costs would be due to increased operational and
research capability, which would be the case under any reor-
ganizational scheme.
In light of the previous discussion regarding regulation of
one executive agency by another, it seems essential that the
new agency be retained in the Executive Office of the President
and have a direct presidential delegation of telecommunications
responsibility and authority. The reorganization should be
accomplished by executive order, thereby assuring maximum
flexibility to make further organizational adjustments as re-
quired.
The extent to which the creation of an independent office
outside the OEP should also call for internal reorganization of
the present OTM processes and structure would necessarily be
the subject of a full management study. There is, however, one
extremely important facet of the existing process which cannot
be ignored when contemplating OTM reorganization: the sec-
recy of the processes by which assignments are made and re-
viewed and the absence of any opportunity for participation by
"interested parties." A major criticism of the existing process
is what one commentator has called "low visibility decision-
making. 211 Perhaps a more accurate characterization would be
the invisibility of decision-making. Without question, an execu-
tive user's mission often prevents disclosure of particular infor-
mation regarding its frequency. In such cases secrecy is essential
and there is no way in which the assignment or utilization can be
held open to public scrutiny. The suggestion that the handling
of such assignments be subject to the formal requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act 212 can scarcely be taken seriously,
since the requirement of nondisclosure of all essential facts con-
cerning the assignment 213 would preclude any meaningful pub-
211. Rosenblum at 19-21.
212. Id. at 53-54. In fairness to Professor Rosenblum, it should
be noted that his proposal to apply APA requirements is meant to
apply generally to all frequency assignments; perhaps he would ac-
knowledge an exception in the case of the military and other "secret
mission" users, although he does not do so in his article.
213. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Republic
of China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551 (D.
Md. 1956). These privileges are preserved by the "'reedom of In-
formation Act," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (Supp. 1968).
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lic notice, participation or scrutiny. However, acknowledging
the necessity for secrecy in the assignment of frequencies to
some Government agencies, the pervasive secrecy which pres-
ently hides the allocation process and its results from public
participation and scrutiny should not be condoned. One dif-
ficulty is that there has been no distinction between, for example,
assignments to the Post Office and to the Air Force. Such dis-
tinctions need to be drawn to ensure, to the greatest possible
degree, public participation in and scrutiny of the processes of
frequency management where no claim for secrecy can reason-
ably be honored.214
2. Reorganization of the FCC
Few agencies of Government have been so doggedly pur-
sued by critics as the FCC. Almost since its creation it has been
a favorite whipping boy of Congress, the bar, the academe and
the general public. Most of the criticism has been directed at
its licensing and regulatory activities within the broadcast field.
For example, its licensing procedures have been the subject of
repeated and intensive criticism, as have been most of its related
regulatory policies. 215 More generally, the Commission has been
repeatedly attacked for its failure to formulate and implement
policy planning. In 1949, the Hoover Commission Task Force on
Regulatory Commissions concluded that "the Commission has...
been found to have failed both to define its primary objectives
and to make many policy determinations required for efficient
214. This would not necessarily entail the establishment of elaborate
formal proceedings. Certainly there should not be any process of
adjudication as is required in formal FCC licensing hearings. But
in cases where there can be no valid claim of secrecy, public notification
of assignment applications, together with opportunity of "interested par-
ties" to file written comments or objections should be provided for. Cf.
section 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. 1968). In addition, informa-
tion pertinent to such assignments should be subject to disclosure in ac-
cordance with the "Freedom of Information Act." 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp.
1968).
215. For a small sample of the critical literature covering a broad
range of Commission activities, see H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL Amwi-
IsTRATivE AGENCIES 53-73 (1962) (licensing; comparative criteria); AD Hoc
ADVISORY COVMiITTEE ON ALLOCATIONS TO TE SENATE COAIMTTEE ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN CO1mmERcE, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ALLOCATION
OF TV CHANNELS (Comm. Print 1958) (licensing policies; television al-
locations); Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations
on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MmNm. L. REV. 67
(1967) (program regulation); Note, The Darkened Channels: UHF Tele-
vision and the FCC, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1578 (1962) (television allocations).
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and expeditious administration. ' 216 In 1960, James Landis re-
peated the charge:
The Commission has drifted, vacillated and stalled in almost
every area. It seems incapable of policy planning, of disposing
within a reasonable period of time the business before it, of
fashioning procedures that are effective to deal with its prob-
lems. 21 7
Though most of the criticism of the FCC's licensing and
regulatory policies in the field of broadcasting would appear
only indirectly relevant to the problem of interservice frequency
allocations and spectrum management, there has been some ten-
dency to apply the criticism of Landis, the Hoover Commission
and others to the Commission's spectrum allocations.2 1 8 This is
rather undiscriminating, however, and it assumes findings and
conclusions about the FCC's performance in the area of spec-
trum allocations which were not made. To the extent the FCC's
performance is relevant at all here, the focus should not be on
its general performance in licensing and regulating broadcast
stations but on its actions and policies in specific regard to inter-
service frequency allocations and general spectrum management.
However, even focusing specifically on problems of spectrum
management policy it must again be emphasized that the per-
tinent question is not whether present policies are deficient,
but whether the deficiency reflects the kind of basic institutional
flaw for which administrative reorganization is appropriate.
(a) Past Reorganizations
For the most part the FCC has not been unresponsive to
proposed reorganizations. After its creation in 1934, the Com-
mission organized itself into three separate and integrated di-
visions for broadcast, telegraph and telephone regulation.
However, in 1937, when it became apparent that the division
plan had in practical effect divided the Commission into three
separate agencies, the plan was abolished.21 9 The Commission
216. COMVIISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTVE BRANCH or
THE GOVERNMENT, COMMITTEE ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS,
TASK FORCE REPORT 95 (1949).
217. J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULA5IXRY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-
ELECT 53 (1960) (printed for the use of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.).
218. See Coase at 36-37.
219. In abolishing the division plan in 1937, the Commission noted
that:
... it was found that to subdivide a small commission in such
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was then organized into four professional units comprising the
Engineering, Accounting, Law and Secretary Departments.
Each department was subdivided into broadcast, common car-
rier, safety and special services and handled licensing and regu-
latory functions in these fields. The seven member Commis-
sion itself functioned as a single unit after 1937.220 This proved
to be inefficient. Following the recommendations of the Hoover
Commission Task Force on Regulatory Commissions in 1948 and
1949,221 the FCC reorganized its staff along functional instead
of professional lines. This reorganization was paralleled by the
1952 McFarland amendments requiring functional reorganization
of the Commission.222
In 1961 one further major reorganization plan was imple-
mented. It originated as one of a series of executive plans for
reorganization of the major independent agencies pursuant to
the Reorganization Act of 1949.223 Though the FCC opposed cer-
tain features of the reorganization and the plan was defeated, its
basic features, which were supported by the Commission, were
subsequently authorized by specific legislation. 224 The principal
a manner had a devisive effect and was not conducive to co-
operation and mutual understanding among the members of
the Commission ....
The organization of the members of the Commission into
divisions also prevented a rounded development of each Com-
missioner's knowledge and experience in the whole field of
the Commission's activity.
4 FCC ANN. REP. 3 (1938). For a brief discussion of the legislative
background and the Commission's reorganization, see H. WARNER, RADIO
AND TELEWsloN LAW 803-05 (1948).
220. See 5 FCC ANN. REP. 9 (1939). A fifth department, the 'Ex-
amining Department," operating in 1938, see 4 FCC Axw. REP. 4 (1938),
was eliminated after that year.
221. See HoovER TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 216, at 97. See also
STAFF REPORT ON m FCC (1948). These recommendations were sup-
ported by the President's Communications Policy Board in 1951, al-
though its comments on FCC reorganization were little more than a note
in passing that "the Commission's present efforts to reorganize itself as
recommended by the Hoover Commission should be pressed" and that
the Commission should have "more funds and a stronger staff." TELE-
COMMUNICATIONs: A PROGRAM FOR PROGRESS at 208.
222. 66 Stat. 711 (1952). See Hearings on S. 1973 Before a Sub-
comm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949);
Hearings on S. 658 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (a later version of S. 1973).
223. Now 5 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964). For a history of the reorganization
plans of 1961, see Note, The Progress of Federal Agency Reorganization
Under the Kennedy Administration, 48 VA. L. Rrv. 300 (1962).
224. 47 U.S.C. § 155 (1964). For a comparison of the defeated ex-




thrust of the 1961 reorganization plan was to permit delegation
of Commission authority to an employee or employee board22 5 in
order to free agency members from such routine tasks as review
of interlocutory and other routine adjudicatory decisions. Fol-
lowing enactment of legislative authorization for such delegation,
the Commission in 1962 established a review board to carry out
certain delegated functions including review of initial decisions
and related orders.226 Contemporaneous with the 1961 reorgan-
ization plan, the Bureau of the Budget commissioned an or-
ganization and management study of the Commission. Fol-
lowing the study's recommendations in substantial part, the Com-
mission made a series of internal changes in its organization and
procedures in 1962 and 1963.227 Since 1963 there have been no
other major changes.
Such internal changes by the FCC have not silenced those
critics who have pressed for more fundamental reform. One of
the most drastic reorganization proposals has been advanced by
FCC Commissioner, Robert Bartley, who has advocated nothing
less than the abolition of the FCC and a redistribution of its
functions among two independent agencies, one legislative and
one executive.228  More recently, legislation has been proposed
along the lines of the Bartley plan.229
(b) The Bartley Plan
In proposing what is essentially the abolition of the FCC,
Commissioner Bartley has borrowed a page from former FCC
Chairman Minow's recommendations for separating and reconsti-
tuting the FCC's "planning," "enforcement" and "quasi-judicial"
functions.230  Unlike Minow's proposal, however, Bartley's
scheme of reorganization is not aimed at separation of the policy
225. The Commission already had authority to delegate authority
to one or a panel of its members.
226. 28 FCC ANN. REP. 16 (1962).
227. The changes are detailed in the 29 FCC ANN. REP. 13-15
(1963).
228. Address by Commissioner Robert Bartley before the Illinois
Broadcaster's Association, May 23, 1968, FCC Release No. 17280. Though
the Bartley proposal is not evidently motivated by the problems of
spectrum management, it does have clear and significant relevance, and
therefore must be considered.
229. See BROADCASTING MAGAZINE, Jan. 13, 1969, at 36 (proposal by
Congressman Dingell).
230. See N. MINOW, EQUAL TIMaE: THE PRIVATE BROADCASTER AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 277-304 (1964).
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planning, enforcement and adjudication functions. Also, in con-
trast to the Minow proposal which presumably would have re-
sulted in unification in an executive agency, the Bartley proposal
would retain the present dual jurisdiction with respect to Gov-
ernment and non-Government use of the spectrum.231
More specifically, the Bartley proposal would reconstitute
the FCC's authority and functions as follows: First, there would
be established a "Federal Broadcast Commission," an independent
regulatory commission with five commissioners appointed by the
President. The Commissioners would have staggered terms of
3, 6, 9, 12 and 15 years with only the 3 and 6 year appointees
eligible for reappointment. Second, a similarly constituted
"common carrier commission" would be established to regu-
late common carriers in the domestic and international tele-
communications service. Third, the Safety and Special Radio
Services Bureau functions of the FCC would be transferred
to the Department of Transportation, since much of that bureau's
work relates to mobile radio. Fourth, the spectrum allocations
functions of the FCC, including treaty responsibilities, would be
transferred to an office within the legislative branch, to be
headed by a Director appointed by the President for a term of
15 years.23 2
Of his proposal Bartley believes:
[T]here would be a more responsible administration of the
differing functions now administered by the FCC if they were
the responsibilities of separate agencies. I think they would
each fare better in their appeals for manpower and money; they
would each be able to concentrate more and become more
expertise [sic] in their more specialized field; the members
could give greater guidance to their staffs on policy planning
and in supervision.23 3
Bartley's central premise that more effective regulation could
be achieved by "more expertise" in a "more specialized field"
must be challenged. Emphasis upon the importance of special-
ized expertise is by no means unique. One can scarcely pick up a
231. First, let us face a few fundamentals. The Congress, espe-
cially in the field of communications, must not surrender its con-
stitutional responsibilities for the regulation of commerce. Nor
should the President surrender his responsibilities as Comman-
der-in-Chief and over Foreign Affairs. So we must accept,
without arguing interminably and unproductively, a dichotomy
of control over the radio spectrum.
Bartley, supra note 228, at 8.
232. Id. at 14-18. This reorganization would not alter the present
authority and functions of the OTM.
233. Id. at 6.
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court opinion in the field of administrative law and not find
therein some encomium on expertise and the necessity of entrust-
ing administrative responsibilities to those who have it. No
doubt expert judgment plays an important role in the ad-
ministrative process. But it is doubtful that what the ad-
ministrative process needs is more of it. Professor Louis Schwartz'
observation that "expertness has been oversold in this country, 23"
seems closer to the point.
What is lacking in the FCC, as in many other agencies, is
not specialized expertise, but quite the opposite: a broader
vision, a wider perspective on the interrelationship of the func-
tions regulated by the Commission with others in society. A ma-
jor failing of the FCC has not been the failure of its members
to give adequate guidance to the staff on matters requiring
specialized knowledge, but rather the failure to provide a broad
perspective within which specialized concerns can be judged. It
is said that FCC members are preoccupied with minor con-
cerns;23 5 that they cannot "see the forest for the trees.1230
Bartley's plan seems ill-designed to correct this. It is true, as
Bartley reasons, that narrowing the range of subjects of atten-
tion will allow agency members greater time for thoughtful re-
flection on both decisions and policy. But his proposal does so
not by separating the trivial from the important; rather it simply
reduces the number of matters to be considered. Instead of
attempting to widen the vision of the forest, it simply reduces the
forest to a single tree.2 37 There are other more practical ob-
jections. Bartley assumes that the functions and responsibilities
of the FCC's three operating bureaus and frequency allocation-
treaty division are so disparate that their presence in a single
agency is not only unnecessary but is an impediment to effective
regulation and planning. In fact it appears that there is a close
234. Schwartz, Legal Restrictions of Competition in the Regulated
Industries: An Abdiction of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REv.
436, 471 (1954).
235. This was, of course, a principal reason for the 1961 reorganiza-
tion plan and the creation of the review board. See note 226 supra, and
accompanying text. It is obvious, however, that while this has some-
what diminished the problem, it has not entirely eliminated it.
236. A variation on the simile has been offered by former FCC
Chairman Newton Minow: "The Commission is a vast and sometimes
dark forest, where FCC hunters are often required to spend weeks of
our time shooting down mosquitoes with elephant guns." N. Miow
EQUAL TImE, THE PRIvATE BROADCASTER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 280
(1964).
237. Compare id.: "[T]he forest must be thinned out and wider,
better marked roads have to be cut through the jungles of red tape."
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and complex interrelationship among all facets of telecommuni-
cations. Consider, for example, the Above 890 mc proceeding2
8
which involved the proposed licensing of private, noncommon
carrier land mobile stations on microwave frequencies previously
assigned to common carriers. Frequency allocations were in-
volved since one of the central issues was whether private use of
microwave would pre-empt frequencies which would be needed
for future space communications. On the other hand, to the
common carriers the most crucial issue was not one of inter-
service allocations policy, but one of licensing and regulatory
policy, since they contended that their status conferred on them
a protection against this competition and the resulting diversion
of revenues. This is a classic issue of common carrier-public
utility regulation. Finally, the private applicants argued that
the expanded need for private land mobile radio frequencies
dictated their access to these frequencies. Can it be said that any
of these three major issues is separate in any meaningful sense?
How would such a case be resolved under the Bartley scheme
where the issues would fall within the separate jurisdictions of
(a) a "legislative agency," the "Telecommunications Resources
Authority;" (b) an independent regulatory commission, the
"Telecommunications Common Carrier Commission;" and (c) an
executive agency, the Department of Transportation? Presum-
ably in the cases of overlapping jurisdiction we would have to
revert to inter-agency coordination. Perhaps this could be ac-
complished, but given the continuous efforts to reduce the
necessity for burdensome and often ineffectual coordination of
related telecommunications functions in the executive branch,
it seems a curiously backward step to create the same problem in
the private sector by splintering the one central authority that
does exist into four separate pieces and trusting to providence
that they can be brought together again when necessary.
There also can be little doubt that this multiple agency sys-
tem would substantially increase the cost of regulation. That
such an increase would not be warmly endorsed by a budget
conscious Congress would seem too obvious to mention were it
not for Bartley's assumption that Congress would be more gen-
erous in providing adequate funds for telecommunications regu-
lation as a result of his proposed reorganization:
Another significant advantage would be that criticism-both
238. Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 mc, 27 F.C.C.
359, 18 P & F RAnio REG. 1767 (1959); Note, 70 YALE L.J. 954 (1961).
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constructive and otherwise-would be directed to specific areas
and thus not involve an entire agency responsible for many
other problems. Radio and television are sitting ducks for un-
just criticism by competitive media. . . . [S]ince it licenses
the private and competitive radio and television stations, the
FCC reaps its full share of adverse publicity. But it is the
whole FCC which is damned-this includes our Common Car-
rier, our Safety and Special and our Field Bureaus. Now, this
criticism reaches the ears of Congress and, I believe, adversely
affects the ... [FCC's] appropriations.23 9
Bartley's conclusion is that by splitting off the various functions
into separate agencies, each function would "fare better in their
appeals for manpower and money."240  This is speculating on
conjecture. True, the FCC has been severely hobbled by inade-
quate appropriations. But a comparison of the FCC's appropria-
tions with those of other major independent agencies shows that
the Commission has fared about as well as most of its less criti-
cised sister agencies. For example, since fiscal 1966, increases in
FCC appropriations have kept pace with those of comparable
agencies such as the CAB, the ICC, the FPC or the SEC.241 Yet
during this time the FC has come under more repeated and con-
tinuous criticism from Congress and the public than any of the
others. Doubtless there are many situations in which agency
criticism does have an influence on appropriations. But if such
reaction were as common, or as indiscriminately casual as Com-
missioner Bartley suggests, the FCC would have to sell pencils
on the street to exist.
The Bartley proposal has been discussed at some length be-
cause it illustrates a common tendency to relate all FCC failures
to alleged institutional flaws and, therefore, to believe that the
solution lies in some sweeping reorganization or other institu-
tional change. As stated earlier, this approach is misdirected. It
may be that the FCC's performance in carrying out many of its
licensing and regulatory responsibilities is deficient and should
be re-evaluated. It may also be that its policies of frequency
allocations should be re-evaluated. But to change the FCC's
religion it hardly seems essential to tear its tabernacle down.
Whether it might be useful to change the icons or fire the
choir is another question, beyond this general survey. It is suf-
239. Bartley, supra note 228, at 7. See also id. at 4.
240. Id. at 6.
241. See Independent Offices and Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development Appropriation Acts for 1969 and 1968, 82 Stat. 937,
81 Stat. 341; Independent Offices Appropriation Acts for 1967 and 1966,
80 Stat. 663; 79 Stat. 520.
1246 [Vol. 53:1179
RADIO SPECTRUM REGULATION
ficient to note here one conclusion of the 1962 management study
-that the "principal underlying cause of FCC administrative de-
ficiency is the lack of an adequate level of appropriation support
in both manpower and equipment terms.1242 The appropriation
problem is particularly serious in the frequency allocations area
where insufficient manpower and equipment have greatly limited
the Commission's monitoring and investigative capacity and have
almost precluded any substantial technical research 243 capacity,
both of which are essential to an effective management of the
spectrum. The appropriation problem is not likely to be re-
solved in the immediate future, given the commitment of funds
to higher priorities. In any event, the Bartley proposal for
inducing additional appropriations does not seem realistic: the
one thing least likely to produce more funds is to restructure the
system to make even the routine functions more costly than
they now are.
Beyond the matter of appropriations, staff and equipment,
there is, finally, the matter of leadership from the Commission
itself. Although the point may seem obvious, one must respect
James Landis' conclusion concerning the Commission's processes
that "no patent solution ... exists other than the incubation of
vigor and courage in the Commission by giving it strong and
competent leadership."244 It is a commonplace observation, but
it is a sound and durable judgment as to which there would
likely be little dispute except over how to obtain such leader-
ship. In this respect the Bartley proposal seems least likely to
achieve this aim insofar as its proposed reconstitution of the
FCC's responsibilities would create offices far inferior in impor-
tance and stature to the FCC today.
242. Quoted in 28 FCC ANN. REP. 16 (1962).
243. The inadequacy of the current budget and staff of both the
FCC and the OTM and the correspondingly inadequate research and
technical capability is emphasized by the President's Task Force and by
the Stanford Research Institute, which has been studying aspects of the
spectrum problem for the FCC. See BROADCASTNG MAGAZINE, De-
cember 16, 1968, at 36, 38; April 7, 1969, at 49. See also Hearings
on Independent Offices and Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, Appropriations for 1969 Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 103-08 (1968). In the
entire area of frequency management, including allocations planning,
research and related activities, the Commission employed an estimated
average of only 102.4 persons in 1968. Id. at 108.
244. J. LAmNDIs, supra note 217, at 54.
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V. ECONOMIC REFORM: THE PRICING SYSTEM AS A
MEANS OF SPECTRUM ALLOCATIONS
In recent years, increasing attention has been given to pro-
posals for an "economic" rather than administrative approach
to frequency allocation. Advocates of this approach are con-
cerned less with specific defects in the present administrative
structure than with the economic inefficiency of the entire sys-
tem of making allocations by administrative choice. They argue
that the problem is simply one of distributing resources, a func-
tion normally accomplished not by administrative fiat, but by
the workings of the market place.
It has been proposed that a pricing system be established for
the distribution of frequency allocation in lieu of administrative
allocation, or at least as a major complement of it. Under such
a system, frequency allocations would be made, at least in part,
through open market sales and purchases, or through some
form of Government supervised bidding or simulated pricing
system. Proponents of this approach point out that the sys-
tem would make allocations automatically, eliminating the need
for administrative judgment. Professor Coase, one of the princi-
pal advocates of such a system, explains it as follows:
Since the amount which a user will pay for a resource reflects
the value of that resource in whatever employment he is con-
templating using it, the pricing system tends to result in that
allocation of a resource between its various uses which maxi-
mizes the value of production. If a price had to be paid for
radio frequencies; Government departments would not use
them unless they felt that, by spending their money in this way,
it would serve the purposes of the department better than by
spending that money in any other way. And if the price was
made sufficiently high so as to bring the demand for radio
frequencies into equality with the supply, this would both
eliminate the need for an administrative allocation and ensure
that radio frequencies were used for those governmental pur-
poses which justified the greatest monetary sacrifice. Since
radio frequencies are also demanded by private users (to whom
they are now allocated by the FCC), if pricing is to be in-
troduced for Government departments, it would seem desirable
that the pricing system should be applied to private users as
well. Private users and Government departments could then
compete for radio frequencies. In this way the price paid by
Government departments would reflect the value of the fre-
quencies to private users and the price paid by private users
would reflect the value of the frequencies to Government
departments. 245
Coase's proposal builds on his earlier suggestion that a pricing
mechanism be used in lieu of the licensing system for distri-
245. Coase at 40-41.
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bution of broadcast frequencies among competing applicants.24 6
Although the earlier proposal seems a radical change, it should
be noted that it called for a change within the existing basic
framework of spectrum allocations. Thus it would have modi-
fied only a small part of the allocations process-the licensing
of broadcast stations. The present proposal is more ambitious.
It appears to be a substitute for substantially all of the present
processes by which allocations are made.
The pricing system proposal, which has in recent years re-
ceived the support of a number of other economists,247 and has
been considerably discussed,248 is based on the premise that radio
frequencies are essentially the same as other scarce economic re-
sources which are allocated by the market pricing system.2 49
To date, the proponents of the pricing system have been con-
tent to talk in abstract terms of the establishment and operation
of the system, making it difficult to define the actual proposal.
Having set forth some vague generalizations about pricing as a
means of allocations, Coase notes simply that:
radio frequencies could be disposed of for long or short leases
or by the creation of property rights .... But it is not the
purpose of this article to consider the legal framework within
which the pricing system would operate. 250
But the problem is not, as Coase suggests, merely a matter of
deciding on an appropriate "legal framework" in which the
system would operate. The problem is finding an economic and
technical framework in which the system could work.
It should be emphasized that, as generally used in price
theory, the resource allocation function of price is based on a
free market in which prices are set, independent of Govern-
ment decision, by the consumer who is the judge of his needs or
246. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAW &
EcoN. 1, 4 (1959). See also Levin, Federal Control of Entry in the
Broadcast Industry, 5 J. LAW & EcoN. 49 (1962).
247. E.g., Levin, The Radio Spectrum: Economic-Physical Character-
istics, quoted in Jones, Use and Regulation of the Radio Spectrum: Re-
port on a Conference, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 71 passim [hereinafter cited as
Jones Report]; Meckling, Management of the Frequency Spectrum, 1968
WAsH. U.L.Q. 26 [hereinafter cited as Meckling]. The Jones arti-
cle is a summary of the Airlie House Conference on the Use and Regu-
lation of the Radio Spectrum.
248. See, e.g., Jones Report; Note, The Crisis in Electromagnetic
Frequency Spectrum Allocation: Abatement Through Market Dis-
tribution, 53 IowA L. RFv. 437, 472-79 (1967).
249. See, e.g., J. BONBRIGHT, PRMCIPLES or PUBLIc Umr RAT s 43-
46 (1961); P. SAMU=SON, ECONOMCS 42-43, 615 passim (7th ed. 1967).
250. Coase at 47.
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wants. Also, by virtue of the absence of Government interven-
tion, the consumer becomes judge not only of the private value
but the social value of the service or product being purchased.251
Thus, it will first be assumed that what is contemplated is some
form of freely competitive market in which competing users'
demands are the exclusive determinant of price. Explicit modifi-
cations on this free market approach by those who advocate a
system of "simulated pricing," will be discussed subsequently.
A. ALLOcATION AMONG DIFFERENT SERVIcES THROUGH INDIVIDUAL
BIDDING AND "OPEN MARKET" PURCHASE AN SALE
Although proponents of the pricing system have not been
very precise in describing how their "market system" would be
implemented, one feature which appears to be central to the
market concept is that individual frequency "rights" would be
created. These rights would be freely transferable to anyone
willing and able to purchase them.252
An initial difficulty is, of course, how to define frequency
"rights" which are capable of being transferred among different
classes of users. Under the existing system, "rights" are defined
largely in terms of "inputs"-the use of particular equipment, at
a particular location, with prescribed limits on power, antenna
height, and other factors, all designed to make optimum utiliza-
tion of particular frequencies with minimal interference. Under
this structure of regulation, each right would be limited to a
particular use and free transferability among different kinds of
use would be impossible.253
The problem of redefining frequency rights in terms relevant
to different classes of users does not seem insurmountable, how-
ever. It would not be inordinately difficult, for example, to re-
define "inputs" in terms of "output"-the ability to radiate
signals of defined strength within particular areas or, alter-
natively, the right to exclude other signals from a particular
area-which could be applied to varying classes of use.25 4 How-
ever, defining frequency rights in terms applicable to varying
classes of use does not overcome all the problems posed by the
free-transferability concept. Rather, it brings into focus more
difficult technical, economic and social problems. The following
251. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 249, at 45.
252. Meckling at 31-32.




discussion is not intended to provide an exhaustive list nor a
complete analysis of the problems, but simply outlines them
and discusses the major considerations that must be evaluated.
1. The Effect on Existing Uses
Any attempt to reorganize the system of spectrum utilization
must recognize that most of the presently usable spectrum
has been allocated not only to the various services, but also to
individual users. While in theory existing users have no vested
property rights in their frequencies, existing and often long-
standing use cannot be ignored. Wholly apart from the diffi-
cult legal problems of interfering with existing use,255 any
wholesale readjustment of frequencies could affect billions of
dollars of investment made on the strength of present allo-
cations. As of 1963, depreciated United States investment in
systems, equipment and research and development facilities re-
lated to the use of the radio spectrum was estimated at some $26
billion. In broadcasting alone the consumer investment in re-
ceivers exceeded $9 billion and the industry investment in equip-
ment, over one-half billion dollars. 256 Such an investment
should not and, indeed, could not be easily disturbed by a
wholesale offering of present uses to open market competitive
bidding.
It has been suggested, however, that simply creating "pro-
perty rights" in present users and allowing these to be freely
transferred by individual purchase and sale would accomplish an
economical, efficient and rational distribution of frequencies. 257
This assumption must be examined.
2. Greater "Economy" of Spectrum Use
The assumption of proponents of the pricing system appears
to be that placing a price on frequencies will result in more
economical use, alleviating if not eliminating stockpiling of fre-
quencies and discouraging inefficient, uneconomical use. Doubt-
less some administrative economies would result, but with re-
spect to a large portion of the spectrum it may be questioned
255. Consider, for example, the nearly endless litigation that at-
tended just one small effort to re-allocate a few television channels in
the deintermixture controversy. See Note, The Darkened Channels:
UHF Television and the FCC, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1578 (1962).
256. DEPARTMENT OF CoMMEzcE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS SCIENCE
PANEL, ELECTROMAGNETIc SPECTRUM UTILIZATIoN-THE SILENT CRISIS 8
(1966).
257. Meckling at 31-32.
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whether the economies would be substantial enough to justify
the complex and expensive mechanisms required to implement
the pricing system. Consider, for example, the military estab-
lishment which is not only one of the largest users, but by many
estimates, one of the largest holders of unused or inefficiently
used frequencies. Market system proponents tend to assume
that once a price tag is placed on frequencies there will be a
sudden realization of their value and holders of frequencies will
accordingly use them more efficiently-either utilize the fre-
quencies or sell them to others who can make "better use" of
them. And if the military does not recognize such economies,
the process of budget review will force it to do so. However,
this picture of economy in Government seems overidealized. If
the present standards of "economy" in defense spending are
taken as a guide to what could be expected in this area, there
is little to kindle enthusiasm about the efficacy of a pricing sys-
tem in producing more economical use of frequencies. 25 8 This is
not to suggest that the military agencies and the Department of
Defense are wholly indifferent to matters of economy and bud-
getary considerations. But in this realm "economy and effi-
ciency" are relative to the size and nature of the activity. For
example, for fiscal year 1968, estimated total expenditures for
the Defense Department exceeded $75 billion.259 Given a budget
of such magnitude, "economy" and "efficiency" is more fre-
quently a matter of whether to have a "light" or "heavy" anti-
missile system than it is whether to use or sell a particular radio
frequency or band of frequencies. Considering the realities of
defense spending, any significant "economizing" of use will likely
be confined to the private sector. Even here, however, it seems
improbable that users will respond with perfect economic "ra-
tionality" to the price system. This is particularly true if exist-
ing users could not practically be forced to bid competitively for
and purchase their presently assigned frequencies. Without such
forced "justificiation" of present use, existing users would be
somewhat slow to respond with the degree of rationality ex-
pected of them-particularly where, as in the case of the military,
matters of "economy" become blurred by other important, and
less measurable, social purposes.
258. On "economy" in the Defense Department, see, e.g., 115 CONG.
REC. S2549-52 (1969) (comments of former official in DOD comptroller's
office).
259. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, BUDGET FOR THE UNITED STATEs Gov-
ERNMENT 282, 291 (1968).
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3. Technically Efficient Utilization of the Spectrum
The tendency of proponents of the pricing system to assume
that radio frequencies are as susceptible to allocation by free
market pricing260 as any other resource reflects an indulgence
in abstract generalization which obscured analysis. The problem
of achieving an efficient allocation and use of the radio spectrum
cannot be defined in terms of economic or social efficiency with-
out consideration of the problem of technical utilization. While
technical utilization is not an important factor with respect to
most goods, the situation is not so simple in the case of radio
frequencies. First, we are concerned with full utilization of an
invaluable resource. Failure to get full technical use from
the resource would be socially wasteful. Second, in terms
of full and efficient use, it makes a substantial difference who
"buys" a given radio frequency band in a particular location and
how he uses it. Other present and prospective users of the same
or other frequencies will be affected in varying degree by such
use; and this in turn will affect the degree to which the spectrum
can be fully and efficiently used.
But the entire approach of the free transferability aspect of
the open market system is incompatible with efficient technical
use and optimum technical utilization. Consider, for example,
the use of channel nine in Los Angeles. It is possible to calculate
interferences which its use for television broadcasting would
cause to other users, and interferences from other users to it, and
to engineer a system of standards for operation which will allow
effective service within a certain definite service area while
minimizing interference to other co-channel and adjacent chan-
nel television stations in other cities. By advanced planning for
this and other television stations, which includes restricting these
frequencies for exclusive television use, an allocations system
for an area-or the entire nation-can be engineered to result in
optimum utilization of these frequencies with reasonably satis-
factory, interference-free service. Such standards have, of
course, been engineered.261 While they are not perfect,2 62 they
at least reflect rational planning and permit a far more efficient
utilization than would be permitted by free transferability of
frequency rights among different users and classes of users.
260. E.g., Meckling at 26.
261. E.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.603-.614 (1967).




Assume that a group of industrial land mobile users in the
Los Angeles area purchases the frequency rights from the chan-
nel nine station. Their use presents an entirely different prob-
lem of effective utilization from that which is presented by
television use. First, the interference which they cause may be
more serious than that of a television station because of the dif-
ficulty of ascertaining and correcting the mobile source of inter-
ference.2 3 Second, this new use may cause a serious problem
of "intermodulation"-the interference caused by interaction of
several signals.264 Third, since interference with users in other
cities may be greater or less than that of channel nine, it will
have to be closely evaluated and the use restricted as necessary.
This would present increasingly complex problems each time a
new transfer was made.
The very nature of the free transferability concept, with its
almost random approach to allocations, would ultimately de-
feat any aim of optimum utilization of the spectrum. Assume, for
example, that after the channel nine transfer, channel eight in
San Diego is sold to aviation users for contemplated use over
southern parts of the state, and the former San Diego licensee
then proposes to purchase channel eight in Los Angeles. At the
same time the particular group of land mobile users who pur-
chased channel nine (186-192 mc) in Los Angeles decide they do
not need so much frequency space, and they sell part of it (186
mc) to a land transportation user group consisting chiefly of the
major bus lines operating throughout southern California. They
also do not need 192 mc, so that band is divided among marine
users operating along the coast, some local aviation users and
amateur radio operators. In such an unchartered, uncontrolled
chain of transfers, altered uses and changing technical circum-
stances, it would be an administrative nightmare even to make
ad hoc adjustments in use to prevent interference; an attempt
to ensure optimum utilization through such a process would be
impossible. Would the land mobile, marine, aviation and ama-
teur radio uses on 186-192 mc in the Los Angeles area as
fully utilized these frequencies as a television station? Does
the use of channel eight for television in Los Angeles "fit" with
fullest utilization of that channel throughout the state? Does
the use of channel eight in San Diego for aviation comport with
full and effective use of these frequencies?
263. Jones Report at 86.
264. Id. at 87-88.
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Complicating the situation is the problem of equipment ad-
justment. Although it might be feasible to transform broadcast
into nonbroadcast frequencies, it does not seem practicable to do
the reverse because present sets could not receive the new fre-
quencies and manufacturers could not be expected to produce
special receivers for each location. Thus, loss of a television
broadcast frequency in a given area as a result of transfer to
nonbroadcast uses could be recouped only within the bands
now available for television use. The transfer of channel nine to
the land mobile users in the above example could not be offset
by purchasing, say, the 48-54 mc band (television channel one)
from the federal government.
Ad hoc allocations could also ultimately lead to reduced
standards and degraded technical servie. As individual trans-
fers were made, there would be persistent pressures to fill in
"gaps" in frequency usage left by ad hoc allocations. There
would also be strong pressures to recoup broadcast services lost
as a result of transfers. To fill in gaps or to recoup lost services,
compromises in engineering standards would often have to be
made. For example, it would be expected that VHF "drop-ins"
-assignments made at less than the required co-channel and
mileage separation requirements26 -- would no longer be the rare
exception but would be prevalent. Some such drop-ins could
doubtless be effected through the use of directionalization and
suppression of radiated signals and other measures to lessen
deterioration of service,26 but repeated adjustments in engineer-
ing standards could ultimately result in degraded service. All
of this would seem obvious for a moment's reflection on the
experience with AM radio, an experience which demonstrated the
chaotic conditions which can result from an ad hoc approach to
allocations. 267 But the results of the free transferability pro-
posal would be infinitely more troublesome. Instead of dealing
with just one particular class of use in AM radio, the Commis-
sion would be forced to deal with virtually all uses intermingled.
4. Social Versus Private Utility
The case for adoption of a market system to allocate radio
265. See, e.g., Report and Order, Interim Policy on VHF TV Chan-
nel Assignments, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 1695 (1961).
266. See id. at 1699, 1701.
267. See Report and Order, Freeze on AM Applications, 13 F.C.C. 2d
866-67, 13 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1667, 1668 (1968); Report and Order, AM
Station Assignment Standards, 29 Fed. Reg. 9492, 2 P & F RAD Io REG.
2d 1658, 1666 (1964).
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frequencies rests on the premise that the pricing mechanism is
the most efficient means of resource allocation and the one which
will normally achieve optimal results. Obviously this is a nor-
mative judgment not an empirical fact; indeed from the evident
tendency of some economists to define optimal allocation as that
which market forces produce, the efficiency of the pricing mech-
anism becomes tautological.
As a general norm of a capitalist economy (though not
necessarily of a democratic society) one must accept, I think, the
pricing system and the principle of "consumer sovereignty" as
the central mechanism of resource allocation. But it is not
necessary to translate "consumer sovereignty" as "the divine
right of kings." We accept the pricing mechanism of the free
market on the trust that it will achieve, if not optimal results, at
least better results than government mechanisms. And it does-
most of the time. But not always: in the idiom of the econo-
mist, there are circumstances where marginal private utility di-
verges from marginal social utility in such a way that market
forces cannot be fully relied on and government intervention,
through subsidy, tax or direct controls, must be considered.20 8
The use of radio frequencies, I believe, presents such a circum-
stance. This is obviously not an occasion in which to attempt to
elaborate the principles of welfare economics to be consulted
on this problem. But one or two of the pertinent concepts can
be very roughly sketched. 269
The situations in which we can look for a divergence between
private utility value-as expressed in a market price-and social
utility value are many and complex. One such situation may
arise where the market itself does not operate "efficiently" be-
cause of imperfect competition. We cannot pause to analyse this
problem here, but it is doubtless one to be considered in
assessing the efficiency of a market system. More troublesome,
however, is the problem of "external economies and disecono-
mies" (to borrow again the jargon of the economist) which may
arise from particular uses: situations where a bad use affects the
welfare of others but where that effect, good or bad, is not re-
268. See, e.g., T. ScrrovsI y, WELFARE AND COMPETrIION 181-88 (1951).
The classic treatment of the distinction between marginal social and
private utility is found in A. PIcou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, ch. IX
(4th ed. 1932).
269. For a fuller discussion of the matters sketched here see W.
BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND T=E THEORY or THE STATE 64-99, 123-34
(2d ed. 1965); R MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIc FnANCE 6-14 (1959);
T. SCITOVSKY, supra note 268.
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flected in price.270 The classic example, that of the air polluting
effects of a factory, finds a striking parallel here in the effect of
electrical interference. Not only does one radio use interfere
with other uses of co-channel and adjacent channel frequencies,
it may also affect the welfare of the public at large which must
suffer the ill effects of lost or degraded service.
In some cases, of course, the effect of a particular use on
others may be made the subject of bargain and the full costs
benefits of the use thus brought into the price. But certainly
this would be uncommon in the case of radio. Even assuming
the possibility of completely identifying all who are directly
affected, there may be no mechanism for reflecting their
interests in the market. Take the case of broadcasting. The
main social objective of and justification for the service is bene-
fit to the public-entertainment, information, education. But in
the process of bidding for television frequency rights, the public
is not really represented. As pointed out by one economist, the
value of the frequency right has no direct correlation to the value
of the broadcast service to the public:
[T]he value [of television time], to the advertisers, is re-
flected in what he is willing to pay for the time, and the value
to the broadcaster of having that time to sell to the advertiser is
reflected in what he is wining to pay for the spectrum if it
were put up for bid. But it is not true ... that the value of the
viewing opportunities thereby afforded the viewer is reflected
in those prices. Very indirectly this may be true in the sense
that what the viewer is going to pay for advertised products
may depend on how much he likes the program, but I ...
wouldn't want to push that argument very far. In this circum-
stance [it cannot be presumed that willingness to pay more
for spectrum use reflects a higher social use].271
The above example is not intended to sound the trumpets
of alarm for the future of television service, however. In fact,
ensuring the continuation of socially valued broadcast service
would not be a major problem since broadcasting is generally
such a profitable use that only in a few instances would other
users find it profitable to purchase broadcast frequencies for less
remunerative nonbroadcast use, although, there may be many
cases where broadcast use of a particular frequency would be
less profitable than alternative nonbroadcast uses.
270. For more extended analyses see W. BAUMOL, supra note 269, at
130-33; R. MusGRAvE, supra note 269, at 8-14. On the inadequacies of
traditional market forces generally in serving social needs see J. GAL-
BRATH, THE NEW INDUsTRIAL STATE (1967).
271. Quoted in Jones Report at 91.
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But the broadcast service illustration suggests the far more
pervasive problem of meeting social needs and wants which
radio, in a variety of forms, can and should serve. Of central
importance here is not merely the fact that some persons affected
by radio have no "economic vote" but the fact that, for a large
array of social wants no means exist to secure the requisite
contributions from individuals except by government action.
The problem of radio spectrum allocation is in this respect
not unique. Despite assertions by Professor Coase and others
that the use of a market pricing mechanism is the "normal"
means of distribution of limited resources in this country,
272
even a cursory examination of the way in which socially impor-
tant goods and services are allocated in our society demonstrates
that reliance on a pure market pricing system is far from uni-
versal. Indeed throughout a large (and seemingly growing)
segment of over economy, goods and services are not allo-
cated entirely-in some cases not primarily-by a free market
pricing system. Consider a service closely analogous to com-
munications, that of transportation. In almost every aspect of
transportation service there is an element of Government con-
trol-rate regulation, service regulation, subsidization of non-
economical service-which has as its direct purpose the allo-
cation of services in ways which would not be obtained if a pure
pricing system were in effect.27
3
This has been recognized by some market system advocates,
who nevertheless argue that a direct money subsidy to "worthy"
frequency users would be preferable to "giving" them fre-
quencies. For example:
[W]hile the police themselves and public safety ... are a
public good, spectrum is in essence no different ... than any
other factor of input.... It is not at all clear that giving away
frequencies ... is the sensible way to subsidize police. [It
may be desirable] to give the policy money instead of fre-
quencies, since it is quite possible that there is a misallocation
of resources as a consequence of the fact [that] we do this,
272. Coase at 40; Meckling at 26.
273. For example, subsidies are given to certain airlines to provide
service to local communities which would not receive such service un-
der a pure market system. 49 U.S.C. § 1376 (1964); see Local Service
Class Subsidy Rate, 34 C.A.B. 428 (1961); CAB BUREAu OF EcoNOMIcs,
SUBSIDY FOR UNITED STATEs CERTEFICATED AI CARIuERs (1968). Apart
from specific "mail" subsidies received by local service carriers, heli-
copter carriers, Alaskan and Hawaiian carriers and one trunkline
(Northeast), all air carriers receive a form of subsidy through the pro-
vision of certain services-navigation aids, weather information, air-
port facilities-at charges not covering cost. R. CAVES, Am TRANSPORT
AND ITS REGULATION 253 (1962).
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because if they had the money they would buy other things
than frequencies. 274
As a matter of economic principle, money subsidies are, I
would concede, preferable to commodity or service subsidies, al-
though certainly less often practical. However, even assuming
that the Government could practicably finance such a program
of money subsidies, it is not clear how this would provide any
standard for, or how it would bring about any significant im-
provement in the allocation of resources. Since money, like
radio frequencies, is a scarce commodity, a judgment would still
have to be made as to how best to apportion the limited sub-
sidies among competing users and competing social needs: to
whom shall subsidies be given, for what purposes and in what
amounts. Obviously this "allocation" decision cannot rely on the
market place since its very purpose is to modify the results of the
market. Reliance must be placed on administrative judgment in
the formulation of which economic value is not decisive. In
short, deciding how to allocate money subsidies turns out to be
little different from deciding how to allocate frequencies.
B. ALLOCATION AMONG USERS WITHIN THE SAME SERVICE THROUGH
Co~METiTivE BIDDING
The principal thrust of recent pricing system proposals has
been the use of pricing as a means of allocating frequencies
among different services with particular emphasis on allocation
among the major service groups such as broadcasting, private
land mobile, military, and others. A more modest proposal is
to employ pricing as a means of allocating frequencies among
users within the various services. Allocations among the major
service categories, and among services, would continue to be
made by administrative decision, but once made, the assignment
of frequencies to users within each service would be by a process
of competitive bidding. This, it is argued, would:
get rid of the party-line congestion in land mobile and ... the
comparative proceeding in broadcasting. ... [I]t permits
you to move services as a group and eliminate some of the
television problems that exist [in the case of isolated trans-
fers] .... [I]t permits you to introduce into the process
... non-economic considerations .... 275
Thus, this proposal is primarily aimed at eliminating the com-
parative hearing process in broadcast licensing and relieving con-
274. Quoted in Jones Report at 91. Compare the criticism of service
subsidies effected by internal subsidization policies, commonly pursued
by regulatory agencies, in Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation,
21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 608 (1968).
275. Quoted in Jones Report at 103-04.
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gestion in the land mobile area.2 7  Without attempting an ex-
tended analysis of this proposal, some comment seems appro-
priate insofar as it bears directly on the use of a pricing system
as a means of spectrum allocation and management.
A primary achievement of this proposal would be the elimin-
ation of the comparative hearing process, a result which would
be considered by many as a highly laudable achievement.277 The
comparative hearing process has been justly maligned. In prac-
tice it tends to be an endless, ill-defined contest-a kind of mod-
ern day analogue to the ancient forms of trial by ordeal. While
past experience indicates that reform is necessary, the competi-
tive bidding procedure would not improve the system. Instead
of establishing standards by which to make a reasoned, meaning-
ful choice between applicants in terms of their qualifications and
ability to serve the public interest, the competitive bidding pro-
posal would abandon all attempts to make any judgment on
qualifications or public interest. It cannot be pretended that
the ability to pay has any necessary correlation to qualifications
or ability to render service to the public. Therefore the bidding
proposal must rest on either of two premises: (a) that society
has no preferences between given applicants, or (b) the present
system does not make a meaningful choice anyway; a bidding
system will at least introduce administrative efficiency.
The first premise cuts against the grain of communications
regulation since 1927 and rejects the concept of public service
which underlies all communication regulation, a concept no in-
formed person, whatever his opinion as to the results of present-
day enforcement, expects to see abandoned. Although the
choice between competing applicants is not easy to make in
terms of meaningful and acceptable criteria, the mere difficulty
of making a choice scarcely justifies not making it when choice
is important.
As to the second premise, it may be quite true that the pres-
ent process has not served to make meaningful choices. Also it
is true that if the criteria for making a choice between competing
applicants are sound one would expect them to be applied to all
applicants-those who are not involved in comparative hear-
ings as well as those who are. But these shortcomings are not in-
276. This proposal is an expanded application of the early sugges-
tion by Professor Coase that a competitive bidding system be substi-
tuted for the comparative hearing process. See note 246 supra, and
accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., Jones Report at 105.
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herent in the system of licensing and they could be remedied
within the system by establishing meaningful criteria for licen-
sing applicants.
The merits of a competitive bidding system as proposed to
be applied to land mobile users are more difficult to analyze since
it is not precisely clear what the proposal entails. It has been
suggested generally that an administrative decision determine
how many land mobiles will be allowed in "any given service"
and that the available frequencies then be "auctioned off."27 8
The primary aim of this plan is to eliminate "party line" sharing
of frequencies and substitute a system of exclusive use as in the
broadcast services. But it is not clear what is meant by the
terms "any given service." It might mean that within each of
the broad categories of land mobile services-public safety, in-
dustrial, land transportation-there would be competitive bid-
ding among each user without regard to whether the user was,
for example, in the business radio service or the petroleum radio
service.27 9 Alternatively it might mean that only within a par-
ticular service, such as the business radio service, would there
be competitive bidding among individual users.
If the former is being proposed, the basic objection previously
raised-that it does not permit a policy judgment to be made as
to the relative social priorities of the different uses-seems ap-
licable. It might be argued that the basic problem of public
policy is resolved once the allocations are made as among the
major service categories, and that within those service categories
it is largely a matter of indifference how the frequencies are
divided: but this seems unacceptable. While it may be that
neither service is entitled to priority over the other since each is
equally important, an even apportionment is not the same thing
as a random apportionment.
However, if the proposal is to introduce a competitive bidding
system as among individual users within the same service, it may
be more worthy of consideration. Under present regulatory
philosophy it does not appear to be a matter of large concern
278. Quoted in Jones Report at 103.
279. Some participants in the Airlie House Conference on the Use
and Regulation of the Radio Spectrum, at which the quoted proposal
was made, appear to have understood this proposal as involving com-
petitive bidding among the major service categories of land mobile
users since they expressed concern about the possible inability of police
or other public safety users to outbid the others. See Jones Report at
104-05. Though this does not seem to be what is contemplated, the
quoted proposal is sufficiently vague to include almost anything.
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which of two business radio users obtains the use of a business
radio frequency. This conclusion is supported by the fact that
individual license qualifications other than citizenship are vir-
tually nonexistent. Unlike the broadcaster, the individual land
mobile user does not have any special public service obligation;
it is enough that a general business purpose is served. If so,
there is perhaps no objection in principle to the proposal to
establish competitive bidding among users. As a practical mat-
ter, however, such a system would not be easily accepted. If
individual land mobile uses are to be made exclusive, or the
amount of sharing is to be limited, it will be difficult to justify a
different process than that which is followed in the case of broad-
casters. The mere appearance of discrimination in the treatment
of broadcast and private land mobile users in this regard would
probably force similar treatment of the two, resulting in a com-
parative evaluation process for land mobile users similar to
that used for broadcasters. Given the present size of the Com-
mission and the number of applicants, this would be impossible.
C. AD isTRATmV ALLOCATION ON THE BASIS OF "SIMULATED"
PRICING
Recognizing the impracticability of a pure market pricing
system, a variant on this has been proposed in which allocations
decisions would continue to be made by administrative decision,
but the decisions would be made to conform to economic criteria
by the use of "simulated" or "shadow" pricing.280
The exact operation of this system of simulated prices is
unclear. One possibility which has been suggested is to compare
the contribution made by the various radio services directly or
indirectly to the gross national product. The reasoning is as
follows: use of radio frequencies is essential to air travel; the
airlines contribute X dollars to the GNP; therefore aviation fre-
quencies used by them contribute, indirectly, X dollars to the
GNP. A moment's reflection reveals the crudeness of such a
formula as a means of valuing a particular frequency or fre-
quency band. The problem is not whether airlines are going to
have frequencies, but rather involves the amount, type and con-
ditions of use of their frequencies.
A more discriminating approach would be for the allocating
agency to establish the value of frequencies to a particular group
280. See the proposals by Professor Levin, quoted and discussed in
Jones Report at 97-102.
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of users by a form of "costing" its use. For example, the value
of the spectrum to land mobile users would be estimated by
calculating capital and labor costs incurred in doing the same job
with and without mobile radio. The value of the spectrum to
broadcasters could be estimated by comparing the cost of de-
livering programs to homes via cable, as compared to conven-
tional over-the-air transmission.28s
While the simulated pricing approach does avoid the prac-
tical problem of creating a market structure in which a free
market pricing system could operate, it does not meet the more
fundamental problem, noted earlier, that there is no necessary
correlation between the value fixed by a pricing system and
social value or social utility. Consider the above example of
"costing" the use of frequencies for broadcast stations. The
implicit assumption is that, apart from cost aspects, the cable
transmission and broadcast distribution systems are substitutes.
But that assumption would clearly be disputed by many who
would argue that broadcast service offers social advantages
which cannot be meaningfully "costed" in an accounting or eco-
nomic sense. The simulated price cannot therefore be used as the
sole or even the primary criterion of administrative judgment.
This is apparently accepted by proponents of the simulated
price approach who nevertheless argue that this approach does
provide a significant criterion for the administrative decision-
maker.28 2 And it does. But, in a general fashion "cost" con-
siderations are already taken into account where possible.283
The question is simply how much more refined and elaborate
should we make the "cost" finding process. Those proposing a
system of "shadow prices" apparently envision a more structured,
formal process for determining cost/price-a process more or
less like a formal valuation or rate-making proceeding. If this
is what is contemplated, the desirability of such a process must
be questioned.
First, it must be recognized thai the development of simu-
281. Id. at 99. Apart from the "cost" comparison between CATV
and broadcasting as a means of setting the "cost" of broadcast use, it
has been argued that a nationwide system of wired television in lieu
of the present broadcast system would enable a large amount of the
spectrum to be reallocated from broadcast to nonbroadcast use. Bar-
nett & Greenberg, A Proposal for Wired City Television, 1968 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1, 22. Such a substitution of wired television for broadcasting
raises many difficult questions of public policy; however, an explora-
tion of these policy questions would require a study in itself.
282. See Jones Report at 99-100.
283. Id. at 100.
1969] 1263
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
lated market data on which to base cost/price findings would
not be an easy task. It has been suggested that without forcing
claimants to undergo actual costs in bidding for frequencies,
exaggeration by rival claimants as to the "costs" of their re-
spective uses would occur, such that the data produced will give
only a very crude indication of actual value.28 4 But a more
basic objection is that economic analysis is not an exact science
capable of commanding general agreement on principles even
among objective analysts. Compounding the normal difficulties
of cost analysis is that here the analysis must include a com-
parative study of diverse services.
Analogy might be made to the problem which has plagued
the ICC in setting the rates for rail, motor and water carriers so
as to "recognize and preserve the inherent advantages" of each
mode 28 5 -the problem of determining in any given case which
type of carrier is the "low cost mode." After years of intermodal
rate-making, fixed standards still have not been established for
determining how the low cost mode is to be determined. 28 6
It might be observed that, while cost analysis would be com-
plex and time consuming, it might be no more so than existing
processes. 28 7 In any event, if such a complex analysis is under-
taken for purposes of intermodal transport rate-making, is it not
equally appropriate to undertake them for the analogous pur-
pose of interservice allocation of radio frequencies? If the
arduous and complex process of cost analysis produced a cri-
terion which would be decisive, or even dominant, it might be
worthwhile. However, for reasons already discussed, it seems
probable that once a "cost" or "price" has been set for the
various uses of frequencies, so little of the decision-making prob-
lem will have been solved as to make the game not worth the
candle. The immeasurable social utility considerations will con-
tinue to loom so large that in most cases the area for adminis-
284. Meckling at 29. See also Jones Report at 101.
285. See National Transportation Policy, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) (pre-
ceding note).
286. See American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 88 Sup. Ct. 2105 (1968). See also ICC v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford R.R., 372 U.S. 744 (1963). In making its cost determinations
the Commission has held "public costs" cannot be considered, largely
because of the "insurmountable problems" of determining and allocating
such costs. Grain In Multiple Car Shipments-River Crossings to the
South, 321 I.C.C. 582 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 229 F. Supp. 572(S.D. Ohio 1964), modified, 379 U.S. 642 (1965).
287. See Meckling at 29.
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trative discretion would have to be as broad as it is under the
present system.
V. CONCLUSION
No one today can reasonably deny that the problems of fre-
quency allocation and spectrum management are becoming ever
more difficult. Demands for frequencies are increasing at an
accelerating pace and the supply of available frequencies is fast
being depleted. The result plainly is that the conflict between
rival frequency claimants is becoming more acute, as is the need
for a closer look at priorities among services and tighter man-
agement control to assure maximum utilization of and optimal
social benefit from the radio spectrum. But, as with all things,
to identify the problem is one thing, to solve it quite another.
The complexity of the problems confronted here-in which
economic, social, technical, legal and, by no means least, political
considerations intrude-would seem to counsel caution in draw-
ing conclusions too quickly or recommending major institutional
change too readily. Unfortunately, such caution has not been
evident in much of the critical commentary on the subject, nor in
a large and seemingly growing number of reform proposals.
Some reform proponents, seizing on the present dual juris-
diction of the FCC and the executive branch as a prime source
of inefficiency and an impediment to sound policy development,
have jumped quickly to the conclusion that unified allocations
authority in a single agency is the salvation. But this con-
clusion provides little real analysis of such questions as whether
and to what extent the dual jurisdiction has really hindered
sound policy development, the probabilities of improving the
situation simply by unifying authority, and the practical impli-
cations of such a change.
The case for unified control is not a compelling one, but
it is not disputed that, other things being equal, it might be
somewhat more efficient and more conducive to effective overall
allocations policy planning to have complete authority vested
in a single agency. But other things are not equal. Essentially,
unification of management control comes down to two alter-
natives: placing control in the hands of the executive or plac-
ing control in the hands of the FCC. The first alternative is
fundamentally at odds with the fact that the executive is the
largest single user of frequencies. Very plainly it is a matter of
putting the wolf in charge of the flock. The second alternative
avoids some of the pitfalls of the first. In general principle, a
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case can be made for FCC control. But giving the FCC unified
authority seems politically unfeasible. First, the FCC is a much
maligned agency and expansion of its authority would be made
more difficult for that reason alone. More important, however,
any attempt to divest the executive of its present authority
would be most forcefully opposed by the military establishment,
which would argue, as it has in the past, that executive control
is essential to national security. In the face of such opposition
there is no chance that Congress would thus delimit "executive
prerogative."
These objections are not dispelled by the proposal to give the
FCC authority subject to appeal and final decision by the Pres-
ident. Although in appearance a judicious compromise, expe-
rience suggests that in ultimate effect this would prove to be
no different from giving complete authority to the executive.
Not all of the advocates for radical administrative reorgan-
ization support unified control of frequency allocations and spec-
trum management. The Bartley proposal would retain dual
jurisdiction over allocations but would completely transform the
structure of spectrum management within the private sector.
However, this "balkanization" of regulatory authority is not only
out of step with the trend toward administrative consolidation,
it is totally misdirected as an effort to meet the current needs
of telecommunications regulation.
Far more drastic than any of the proposals for adminis-
trative reform are a number of proposals for eliminating or at
least minimizing the administrative process itself, substituting
an "economic process" in which allocations are made through
some form of open market or administratively determined pric-
ing of frequencies. This economic approach has attracted great
interest and considerable support in many circles. The attrac-
tion is not difficult to appreciate. In contrast to a system in
which allocations are the result of a complex and uncertain mix of
subjective judgment, dimly outlined priorities and policies, "ir-
rational" politics and "semirational" legal standards, a pricing
system promises simplicity, "rationality," objectivity and all the
other ideals of economic science. The rather basic practical
impediments to the implementation of a system in which price
is made to control frequency allocations do not seem to have
significantly dampened the enthusiasm of those who are con-
tent to leave such "detail" to the lawyers and other "technicians"
in attendance. Nor does there appear to be any marked con-
cern among those who vigorously press for such a system that
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it is ill-designed to evaluate and measure the social interests
and needs served by the variable uses of radio, except by forcing
them onto the procrustean bed of economic efficiency. Perhaps
this is symptomatic of a larger bias. As Professor Galbraith
has observed (with exaggeration permitted of artistic license):
"This is the modern morality. St. Peter is assumed to ask appli-
cants only what they have done to increase the GNP."28 8 But
it is not the intention of this article to disparage the im-
portance of economic considerations, and their relevance to
the process of making radio frequency allocations is not disputed.
The proposals to implement a pricing system are objectionable,
not because they introduce irrelevant considerations, but because
they explicitly or implicitly make economic achievement the
primary, or even the exclusive, test of social needs and interests.
Proposals for sweeping institutional overhaul of the system
offer no panacea to the problems of radio frequency allocation
and spectrum management. This is not to intimate that some
administrative reorganization is not clearly needed. On the con-
trary, there is a vital need for a stronger, more independent
executive authority to manage the Government's use of fre-
quencies more effectively. However, the institutional changes
required to accomplish this do not entail any great organizational
or administrative upheaval. Apart from the task of reconstitut-
ing the present authority and responsibility in an independent
office, the problem of strengthening executive management es-
sentially becomes the familiar problem of adequate budget,
staff and effective leadership.
Similar conclusions may be drawn with respect to the FCC.
It has been organized and reorganized. There may be some
further administrative changes which could be made, but the
present basic organization, which essentially meets the recom-
mendations of the Hoover Commission, the Landis Report and
the most recent (1961-62) management study, seems well con-
ceived. And, incredible as it may seem to some critics, the FCC
has been in the vanguard of the major federal agencies in some
major procedural respects. 2 9 Yet it cannot be pretended that
such reorganizations and the adoption of such "modern" tech-
niques have insured a more adequate performance by the FCC in
288. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 270, at 408.
289. For example, in its use of rule-making procedures in formulat-
ing substantive policy, the FCC has long been in advance of other agen-
cies who have been urged to follow the FCC's example in this aspect.
E.g., E. REDFORD, NATIONAL REGULATORY COMISSIONs, NEED FOR A NEW
LooK 17 (1959).
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discharging many of its regulatory responsibilities. To all but
the theologians of administrative reform this should be cause for
some skepticism about the efficacy of continued institutional re-
organization and administrative process reform. Something else
is evidently needed. No amount of reorganization and reform,
however artful, can satisfy or supplant the FCC's critical need
for a more adequate capability for research and planning, for
monitoring and inspecting the use of assigned frequencies, and for
more effective processing of the hundreds of thousands of license
applications. And, of course, there is the ever present need for
strong leadership-a commonplace observation which is all too
often spurned by the architects of administrative reform.
Ultimately it must be recognized that institutional reor-
ganization and administrative process reform has limits beyond
which it can no longer be relied upon to resolve the problems
of regulation. Thereafter, persistent attachment to continued
reorganization and reform becomes simply evasive insofar as it
ignores the inevitable necessity to confront and resolve difficult
policy issues and make hard decisional choices. Today in the
field of spectrum allocation and management, the necessity to
confront the complex issues of public policy, particularly to es-
tablish priorities of need among competing uses and to make hard
choices among competing demands-or at least make acceptable,
workable compromises-cannot be avoided by elaborate reor-
ganization plans or sweeping changes in administrative processes.
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